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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

The Meaning of the Election
It would of course be utterly tacky for the proprietor of In Luce Tua to remind its readers that he
predicted-way last January-the outcome of the
presidential election. But he did. It remains now
only to explain why things turned out in their ordained manner.
The answer is not hard to find (it is indeed difficult to ignore), but one would not imagine so
from a very large segment of presumably informed
opinion. Much of the immediate post-election
analysis located the reason for the outcome either
in the presumed ineptitude of the Michael Dukakis
campaign or-the same point in reverse-in the unprincipled shrewdness that supposedly guided the
George Bush effort. (It is nothing short of astonishing how rapidly the media depiction of Bush progressed in the course of the campaign from that of
wimp to forceful leader to bully.) There is no doubt
that the Republicans ran more effectively than did
the Democrats, but it is not to the relative efficiency
of the two campaign efforts that we should look to
explain how things turned out.
As always in social analysis, one should begin with
the obvious. The campaign was conducted under
prevailing conditions of peace and prosperity-however uneasy the former and uneven the latter-and
such conditions give an enormous boost to the candidate of the incumbent party. Associated with that
is the extraordinary continuing popularity of
Ronald Reagan , a phenomenon that transcends ordinary political experience or understanding but
which obviously aided his Vice President. Then too,
the Republican party begins every presidential campaign with a large advantage in the form of its virtual lock on the electoral votes of the South and
most of the West. Other things equal, it takes a lot
of blundering on the part of the GOP (or unwonted
political sagacity or good luck on the part of the
Democrats) for presidential elections to turn out
otherwise than with a Republican victory. Or so, at
least, the results of five of the last six elections
would suggest.
But of course initial advantages, however much
they might accumulate, do not by themselves decree
the outcomes of particular elections. Specific candidates and issues make a great, often determinative,
difference, which is why post-election attention has
focused on the personalities and campaign
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strategies of Dukakis and Bush. After all, whatever
chronic difficulties Democratic candidates might
face, the fact remains that Governor Dukakis
emerged from his party's convention in Atlanta in
July with an eighteen-point lead in the polls, one he
managed by election day to turn into an eight-point
deficit. No wonder the prevailing question becomes,
how did he manage to blow it (or Bush manage to
turn things around)?
It is true that the Vice President ran an effective
campaign, whatever one thinks of its ethical or aesthetic level. He got rid of the wimp image with a
first-rate convention speech and vigorous campaigning thereafter. He put Dukakis on the defensive
early and managed to make the Governor's record
rather than his own the focus of attention. It is also
true that Dukakis could have campaigned better
than he did: he moved uncertainly from one theme
to another, he sometimes seemed detached and distant in personality (e.g., during the crucial second
debate), and he never found an effective way of refuting Bush's charges against him on social issues.
Yet too close a focus on the details of the campaign exaggerates their effects and obscures the
larger forces that shaped the outcome of the election. Too much has been made, for example, of the
nastiness of the Bush campaign. It was negative and
it did at times border on the trivial, but it exceeded
neither the generally accepted limits of permissible
political hardball nor the record of past presidential
campaigns with respect to political etiquette. It was
not demagogic of Bush to raise the prison-furlough
and pledge-of-allegiance issues, and in raising them
he did not significantly distort Dukakis' record (the
one issue where he perhaps did so was on the environment, the Boston Harbor television ad in particular). It is absurd to equate the Bush campaign's
tactics with McCarthyism. In any case, the Dukakis
bmpaign gave as good as it got, beginning with the
sneering personal attacks on Bush· at the Democratic convention and concluding with a crudely nativist
assault ad against the Republicans that ran only on
the very last days of the campaign (and that virtually no one has made mention of).
Nor is it either reasonable or fair to pin the Democrats' loss on Michael Dukakis' personal inadequacies. In fact, the Governor displayed
throughout the campaign a high degree of intelligence, integrity, psychological balance, and ability to
articulate his position. He was not, it is true, Mr.
3

Warmth, but on balance, whatever his limitations,
he ran a creditable campaign. His burdens were essentially political, not personal, and they were the
burdens not of Michael Dukakis alone but of the
liberal wing of the Democratic party of which he is
a representative figure.
Dukakis lost, in short, because he is a liberal, and
if the Democrats want to stop losing presidential
elections, they need to change not their candidates'
personalities or campaign strategies but their ideology. Dukakis indicated awareness of his vulnerability on this point when he insisted in his acceptance
speech at the convention that the election was about
(read, ought to be about) competence, not ideology.
But the Republicans knew better than to let
Dukakis frame the issues on his terms, and they relentlessly focused their campaign on all those liberal
weak points that in the carefully circumscribed
ideological world of the Democratic primaries and
caucuses had never seen the light of day.
To demonstrate the Democratic dilemma, one
need only point to the extraordinary developments
of the last ten days of the campaign, when Dukakis
drew dramatic attention to himself by finally conceding what Bush had been insisting on all along,
that yes, indeed, he was a liberal. What better evidence of the political albatross that adherence to
liberalism has become than that confession of the
attachment is almost universally acknowledged as an
act of noteworthy political boldness, even, perhaps,
of reckless courage. But there is more: even
Dukakis' confession of liberalism came in carefully
qualified terms. He was, he said, a liberal in the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and
John Kennedy, thereby studiously distancing himself by silence from what liberalism has become in
the quarter-century since JFK's death. And it is that
liberalism, not that of the New Deal tradition, that
has become a political kiss of death.
On economic issues, liberalism-at least the
populist liberalism of the New Deal-is still more an
asset than a liability, though less conclusively so
than it was through the early 1960s. Voters continue to favor Democrats on issues of economic distribution, but they are less sure than they once were
that the Democrats are also to be preferred to the
GOP on questions of overall economic management. Jimmy Carter's misadventures with stagflation in the 1970s reduced but did not eliminate the
traditional Democratic advantage on economic concerns. When deeply in trouble at the end of the
campaign, Dukakis turned to the enduring populist
theme of economic justice that has been every
Democratic candidate's issue of last resort since the
4

Great Depression.
But the politics of nostalgia was not enough for
the Democrats ·in 1988, any more than it has generally been since the late Sixties. It could not overcome the disability liberalism has become in the
realms of defense and foreign policy or in social/
cultural affairs. Vice President Bush talked of the
differences between himself and Dukakis in terms
of a Great Divide, and however much an exercise
in hyperbole many might take that to be, it expresses the gap that exists for the majority of middle
Americans between their own concerns and those of
the liberal community.
The Democrats have never fully recovered from
the McGovernizing of the party that was the product of the Vietnam experience-the great reshaping
event of modern American politics-and that first
expressed itself in the New Politics campaigns of
Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy in 1968.
America almost came apart in the late Sixties, and
the divisiveness of the times took its most intense
political form within the liberal community in general and the Democratic party in particular. As a
significant portion of the liberal movement lurched
spasmodically to the Left, it removed itself from the
vital center of American politics and entered upon
a curious process of self-marginalization. Liberalism
became the adversary culture, and Americans lost
confidence in a movement and a party that had to
a considerable degree lost confidence in American
society itself. Both the Fulbright/McGovern skepticism about American purposes abroad and the
counter-cultural assault on traditional values in the
social/cultural realm (in areas touching on patriotism, school prayer, feminism [especially abortion], gay rights, racial and sexual quotas, crime and
punishment, family life) took the Democratic party
along paths that the majority of Americans declined
to follow .
Things have cooled down considerably since the
1960s, of course, but the legacy of alienated
liberalism remains strong enough within the Democratic party that it continues to accept as presidential candidates only people who, like Dukakis, then
have to spend a good part of the general election
campaign awkwardly explaining away their records
and policy positions. Which means that, other than
in times of economic disarray, the Democrats' best
weapon of economic populism gets trumped by the
gift of cultural populism that the liberals within the
party have bestowed on the GOP.
And that explains why, for the foreseeable future, it will continue to make sense to put your
presidential-election money on the Republicans. Cl
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James V. Bachman

THE TRADITIONS OF MEN
Alasdair Macintyre and the Rationality of Traditions

Alasdair Macintyre's latest book, Whose justice?
Which Rationality?, has at least two different but related aims. One is to illuminate contemporary social
and political confusion in terms of an account of
what went wrong in the Enlightenment and to indicate what rationality must look like now that we
have recognized what went wrong. The other is to
argue that the Thomist tradition emerges as the
strongest contender for our allegiance now that Enlightenment liberalism has failed .
Macintyre's account of what went wrong in the
Enlightenment is likely to be the more interesting
part of the book, especially for any who think they
still have some cause to rejoice in the Enlightenment. The account is interesting not only because it
provides much food for thought, but also because
it ends up, despite Macintyre's intentions, vindicating at least part of the Enlightenment tradition of
liberalism.
In this essay I will sketch Macintyre's crucial notion of the "rationality of traditions." Then I will
examine how he puts this notion to work in the
criticism of Enlightenment liberalism. I hope to
show that Macintyre's own criticism of the Enlightenment requires the use of resources drawn
from the Enlightenment as well as from his notion
of the rationality of traditions. What is more, the
Enlightenment resources he needs are ones he has
been trying explicitly to reject.
This essay is not a regular review, and it will omit
many important things that could be mentioned
about Macintyre's book. I should therefore record

Next month, James V. Bachman will join the Valparaiso University Department of Philosophy as the first occupant of the John R. Eckrich Chair in Religion and the
Healing Arts. His previous essay in The Cresset, "Of
Pluralism, Truth, and Abortion," appeared in March,
1987.
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that I have found the book to be a very rewarding
read, despite its sometimes convoluted syntax. Here
is a brief map to a number of topics in the book
that will not receive much attention in what follows.
First, there is much thought-provoking intellectual
and social historical material. Chapters II-VIII provide an interesting interpretation of the development of Greek thought from Homer through Aristotle. Macintyre helpfully draws on recent scholarship that shows much more continuity between
Plato and Aristotle than is often acknowledged.
Chapters IX-XI sketch the coming together of
Greek philosophy with biblical faith, first in Augustine and then in Thomas Aquinas. Chapters XIIXVI approach the ongms of Enlightenment
liberalism through an attempt to put Hume in the
context of Scottish social, political, and philosophical life. Chapter XVII, "Liberalism Transformed
into a Tradition," includes some of Macintyre's
sharpest criticisms of the Enlightenment. The concluding Chapters, XVIII and XX, set out Macintyre's theory of the "rationality of traditions," and
these will receive primary attention in this essay.
Chapter XIX contains his discussion of problems
with traditions and translations.
A few smaller sections are important to highlight:
pp. 290ff. provide some interesting comments on
Hume and the "first-person point of view" that
comes in with the "way of ideas." It is worth noting
the discussion of theories of truth on pp. 356ff. as
well as earlier adumbrations of Macintyre's account
in the historical narratives (cf. pp. 7lff., 144, and
167ff.) Sharp criticisms of modern universities and
courses of study are to be found on pp. 385ff. and
399f.
I

It is no news today that many of the promises of
the Enlightenment have failed of fu lfillment. MacIntyre brings to the fore most of the criticisms of
5

the Enlightenment now current. In his first chapter
he characterizes the main problem with the Enlightenment this way:
the legacy of the Enlightenment has been the provision
of an ideal of rational justification which it has proved
impossible to attain. And hence in key part derives the
inability within our culture to unite conviction and rational justification. . . . Conviction effectively has acquired a life of its own, independent of rational enquiry. (6)

Macintyre charts the various ways in which the
heirs of the Enlightenment have responded to this
inability to unite conviction and rational justification. Some have resorted to "academic philosophy,"
but contemporary philosophy, whether analytic or
continental, "turns out by and large to provide
means for a more accurate and informed definition
of disagreement rather than for progress toward its
resolution." (3) Another option is for an individual
to participate "in the life of one of those groups
whose thought and action are informed by some
distinctive profession of settled conviction with regard to justice and to practical rationality." (4)
Those who resort to this option may be called
"fideists." There are both religious and secular
fideists, but in neither case can they escape "the
charge of a certain arbitrariness in their commitments." (4) Macintyre has some fun with this.
To the readership of the New York Times, or at least
to that part of it which shares the presuppositions of
those who write that parish magazine of affluent and
self-congratulatory liberal enlightenment, the congregations of evangelical fundamentalism appear unfashionably unenlightened. But to the members of those congregations that readership appears to be just as much
a community of prerational faith as they themselves are
but one whose members, unlike themselves, fail to recognize themselves for what they are, and hence are in
no position to level charges of irrationality at them or
any one else. (5)

There is a darker side, however, to life in the legacy
of the Enlightenment.
Many a modern person "finds him or herself an
alien to every tradition of enquiry which he or she
encounters and who does so because he or she
brings to the encounter with such tradition standards of rational justification which the beliefs of
no tradition could satisfy." (395) This alienation results in many moderns living
betwixt and between, accepting usually unquestioningly
the assumptions of the dominant liberal individualist
forms of public life, but drawing in different areas of
their lives upon a variety of tradition-generated resources of thought and action, transmitted from a vari-
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ety of familial, religious, educational, and other social
and cultural sources. This type of self, which has too
many half-convictions and too few settled coherent convictions, too many partly formulated alternatives and
too few opportunities to evaluate them systematically,
brings to its encounters with the claims of rival traditions a fundamental incoherence which is too disturbing
to be admitted to self-conscious awareness except on the
rarest of occasions. (397)

Escape from this fundamental incoherence requires finding a way to overcome our alienation
from traditions of enquiry, but the Enlightenment
has blinded us to the rationality of tradition-based
enquiry. Recovery of such a conception of rational
enquiry will not be easy. It will in fact require an
experience "amounting to a conversion." (396) The
reader may not end up converting, but at least the
gospel can be preached. Here then is a brief account of the "rationality of traditions" that is to
cure our modern, Enlightenment ills. (Some may
find it useful to compare Macintyre's theory to
Thomas Kuhn's arguments in the The Structure of
Scientific R evolutions ( 1970), but I will not be working from that comparison here.)
First, a definition of "tradition" is in order:
A tradition is an argument extended through time in
which certain fundamental agreements are defined and
redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with
critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject
all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates
through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose
progress a tradition is constituted. (12)

Chapter XVIII, "The Rationality of Traditions,"
is the chapter to which we must now turn. The first
point to note is that traditions of rational enquiry
are inextricably "part of the elaboration of a mode
of social and moral life of which the intellectual enquiry itself was an integral part." (349) What this
means is that
there is no other way to engage in the formulation,
elaboration, •·ational justification, and criticism of accounts of practical rationality and justice except from
within some one particular tradition in conversation,
cooperation, and con flict with those who inhabit the
same tradition. There is no standing ground, no place
for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned
argument apart from that which is provided by some
particular tradition or other. (350)

On this view any community which embodies a
genuine tradition must inevitably be practicing what
it preaches. There will not otherwise be a tradition,
The Cresset

nor will the community in any other way be in a position rationally to evaluate its own (or any other)
doctrine, practice, and discourse. Indeed, even Enlightenment liberalism inevitably embodies its form
of rationality in a particular mode of moral, social,
and political life.
Macintyre thinks that if you are a well-indoctrinated liberal you will most likely at this point argue
as follows:
If the only available standards of rationality are those
made available by and within traditions, then no issue
between contending traditions is rationally decidable.
... There can be no rationality as such. (352)

Macintyre says that from this Enlightenment vantage point the options will seem to be either to attempt to resurrect the failed Enlightenment criticism of traditions or to turn to relativism or
perspectivism. Relativism claims that every set of
standards, every tradition, "has as much and as little
claim to our allegiance as any other." Perspectivism
claims that all traditions should be understood to be
"providing very different, complementary perspectives for envisaging the realities about which they
speak to us." (352) The protagonists of relativism
and perspectivism "claim that if the Enlightenment
conceptions of truth and rationality cannot be sustained, theirs is the only possible alternative." (353)

Macintyre believes that relativists
and perspectivists are heirs of the
Enlightenment, and that once
Enlightenment errors are exposed so
also will be those of relativism and
perspectivism. The way to expose
all the errors is to expound the
rationality of traditions.
Macintyre emphatically disagrees. He thinks
these options to be the "inverted mirror image" of\
the Enlightenment. Far from being enemies of the
Enlightenment, these misguided folks are simply its
heirs. Once the errors of the Enlightenment are exposed, so also will be the errors of relativism and
perspectivism. The way to expose all the errors is to
expound the rationality of traditions.
Macintyre argues that the "rationality of a tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive enquiry is
in key and essential part a matter of the kind of
progress which it makes through a number of welldefined types of stage." (354) There are three types
December, 1988

of stage: "a first in which the relevant beliefs, texts,
and authorities have not yet been put in question;
a second in which inadequacies of various types
have been identified, but not yet remedied; and a
third in which response to those inadequacies has
resulted in a set of reformulations, reevaluations,
and new formulations and evaluations, designed to
remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations."
(355)
This three-stage process enables us to understand
the nature of "truth." Macintyre offers a very
thoughtful and thought-provoking discussion of
theories of truth:
The test for truth in the present, therefore, is always to
summon up as many questions and as many objections
of the greatest strength possible; what can be justifiably
claimed as true is what has sufficiently withstood such
dialectical questioning and framing of objections. In
what does such sufficiency consist? That too is a question to which answers have to be produced and to
which rival and competing answers will compete rationally , just insofar as they are tested dialectically, in
order to discover which is the best answer to be proposed so far. (358)

It is in stages two and three of a tradition's development that such tests for truth are elaborated.
It should be noted that Macintyre's account of a
tradition's development permits and indeed seems
to predict that stages two and three will be repeated
over and over throughout a rational tradition's history.
In this light it appears that genuinely rational traditions of enquiry will develope some "common
characteristic, if not universal, patterns" over time.
Standard forms of argument will be developed, and requirements for successful dialectical questioning established . . . . The identification of incoherence within established belief will always provide a reason for enguiring further, but not in itself a conclusive reason for rejecting established belief, until something more
adequate because less incoherent has been discovered.
At every stage beliefs and judgments will be justified by
reference to the beliefs and judgments of the previous
stage, and insofar as a tradition has constituted itself as
a successful form of enquiry, .the claims to truth made
within that tradition will always be in some specifiable
way less vulnerable to dialectical questioning and objection then were their predecessors. (359)

Macintyre briefly discusses how this conception
of the rationality of traditions is at odds with both
Cartesianism and Hegelianism. Contra Descartes,
first principles are justified only because they have
"vindicated themselves as superior to their historical
predecessors. Hence such first principles are not
self-sufficient, self-justifying epistemological first
7

principles." (360) Contra Hegel, "the Absolute
Knowledge of the Hegelian system is from this tradition-constituted standpoint a chimaera. No one at
any stage can ever rule out the future possibility of
their present beliefs and judgments being shown to
be inadequate in a variety of ways." (361)

In Macintyre's scheme, it is the
possibility of a genuine failure of
a tradition that is to give
non-relativist and non-perspectivist
meaning to the claim that the
"rationality of traditions" gives
us a way out of the crisis brought
on by the Enlightenment.
Macintyre argues that the answer to relativism
and to perspectivism "has to begin from considering
... that trad itions attain or fail to attain intellectual
matu rity. At any point it may happen to any tradition-constituted enquiry that by its own standards of
progress it ceases to make progress." (360f.) When
this happens the tradition is said to be in an "epistemological crisis." Macintyre's account of the rationality of traditions says, in effect, that unless the
tradition can solve its crisis in an appropriate way,
then the tradition fails and it is no longer rational
to work within it. It is this possibility of the genuine
fai lure of a tradition that is to give non-relativist
and non-perspectivist meaning to the claim that the
"rationality of traditions" gives us a way out of the
crisis brought on by the Enlightenment.
The solution to a genuine epistemological crisis requires
the invention or discovery of new concepts and the
framing of some new type or types of theory which
meet three highly exacting requirements. First, this in
some ways radically new and conceptually enriched
scheme, if it is to put an end to epistemological crisis,
must furnish a solution to the problems which had previously proved intractable in a systematic and coherent
way. Second, it must also provide an explanation of just
what it was which rendered the tradition, before it had
acquired these new resources, sterile or incoherent or
both. And third , these first two tasks must be carried
out in a way which exhibits some fundamental continuity of the new conceptual and theoretical structures
with the shared beliefs in terms of which the tradition
of enquiry had been defined up to this point. (362)
This account is said to defeat the relativist because the relativist is committed to saying that each
tradition will always be able to vindicate its own
8

truths. A tradition which fails to meet the "three
exacting requirements" will have failed to do what
the relativist claims it can always do. Also, in actual
fact, adherents of a failed tradition tend rather
quickly to move on into some alien tradition on a
rational basis. That is to say, they look for an alien
tradition that can help them understand and solve
their problems. In this sense it is untrue "that traditions, understood as each possessing its own account
of and practicers of rational justification, therefore
cannot defeat or be defeated by other traditions. It
is in respect of their adequacy or inadequacy in
their responses to epistemological crises that traditions are vindicated or fail to be vindicated." (366)
Furthermore, the relativist also seems unable to account for the fact that some traditions simply collapse and the problems generated within them find
no solution anywhere.
The perspectivist challenge fails because it too "is
committed to maintaining that no claim to truth
made in the name of any one competing tradition
could defeat the claims to truth made in the name
of its rivals." (367) The perspectivist has underestimated "how integral the conception of truth is to
tradition-constituted forms of enquiry." (367)
This, in essentials, is Macintyre's account of the
rationality of traditions. There are a couple features
of it that Macintyre does not specifically highlight
in chapter XVIII, but which seem to be crucial not
only in chapter XVIII's account, but also in the way
the account is to criticize the Enlightenment tradition. A first feature worth noting is that Macintyre
sometimes seems to imply that a given individual
cannot participate simultaneously in two traditions
that are antagonistic to each other. Life and
thought within a vital tradition appear to be so allencompassing as to make it impossible for a person
to move within more then one circle. There is no
other way to be rational "except from within some
one particular tradition in conversation, cooperation,
and conflict with those who inhabit the same tradition." (350; emphasis mine) Whenever the possibility
of moving rationally among traditions is mentioned
by Macintyre, it is usually criticized as a notion that
only a benighted Enlightenment liberal cou ld entertain. On the other hand , a central hero in the book,
Thomas Aquinas , is said to have successfully synthesized what had been two previously alien and antagonistic traditions-Augustinian Christianity and
Aristotelianism. More must be said about this problem as it relates to Macintyre's project of criticizing
and transcending the Enlightenment.
Related to this first feature of his account of the
rationality of traditions is a second: the implication
The Cresset

that the rationality of a tradition can only ultimately
be assessed from within. An alien tradition will, of
course, have plenty of resources within itself for arguing that a conflicting tradition embodies falsehoods. But in the way Macintyre has set things up,
only those within a tradition can legitimately tell
whether it is in a fatal epistemological crisis. It is
only "by its own standards of progress" that a tradition can significantly recognize that it is failing to
make progress. (361) And only those within can tell
whether a new development in the tradition meets
the three requirements Macintyre sets for the solution of a crisis.
In noting these two features of the theory I am
not suggesting that under their terms a tradition
will be able perpetually to go on fooling itself and
others about its crisis. The scheme does seem to
show a way in which a tradition may eventually fail
in its pursuit of truth. The point I wish to note is
that, on Macintyre's account, no opposing tradition
ever defeats another tradition. Instead, according to
Macintyre's scheme, a tradition fails only by defeating itself through failure to solve its epistemological
crisis. Other traditions win only in the sense that
they remain on the field. To be sure, in order to
claim the allegiance of those fleeing the failed tradition, it is the case that the other traditions will need
to be able on their own terms to explain and solve
or dissolve the problems which destroyed the failed
tradition. But even if the other traditions cannot
solve the problems to the satisfaction of the orphaned community, they can nevertheless remain in
the field so long as they are able, within themselves
and on their own terms, to avoid a fatal epistemological crisis.
II

These two features of Macintyre's account of the
rationality of traditions are essential to his criticism
of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment went
wrong, he says, by providing "an ideal of rational
justification which it has proved impossible to attain." (6) The specific error in this ideal was that of
asserting there could be "principles of shared rationality" across the lines of traditions. (355) The
Enlightenment has failed to provide such principles,
and "this provides the strongest reason that we can
actually have for assertion that there is no such
neutral grounds, that there is no place for appeals
to a practical-rationality-as-such or a justice-as-such
to which all rational persons would by their very rationality be compelled to give their allegiance."
(346) Again, "there is no set of independent stanDecember, 1988

dards of rational justification by appeal to which the
issue between contending traditions can be decided." (351) So, one must be thoroughly initiated
into some one tradition of rationality, and only from
within a tradition can one truly discover either that
it has failed or that it is continuing to make progress.
I noted at the beginning that Macintyre has two
aims in this book. One is to show that the Enlightenment tradition has failed, and the other is to
argue that the Thomist tradition is a likely contender for our allegiance. His own theory of the rationality of traditions puts him in a significant difficulty
over how he should pursue his aims.
Take first his desire to show that the Enlightenment tradition has failed. He can, of course, use
Thomist principles of rationality to show that Enlightenment principles are wrong. In fact, the account of the rationality of traditions that he has
given is rooted in the Thomist tradition. Macintyre
thinks it is plain that tradition-based rationality is
not to be found in the Enlightenment tradition. But
by Macintyre's own Thomist account, no theory
which is alien to the Enlightenment can provide rational grounds for the heirs of the Enlightenment
to think that their tradition has failed. On Macintyre's own theory, a genuinely rational demonstration that the Enlightenment tradition has failed requires that the thoroughly committed adherents of
the tradition themselves acknowledge that they are
in an epistemological crisis for which the tradition
has no solutions. But this would seem to require
that as rational critic of the Enlightenment, Macintyre should be not an adherent of the Thomist tradition but rather of the Enlightenment tradition.
There is perhaps a way out of this dilemma.
Macintyre could argue that he began as a loyal
adherent of the Enlightenment. He might refer us
to work he did in the 1960s. In an essay, "Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing," he
offered a fine Enlightenment criticism of Christianity. (1964, 76ff.) He also claimed in good Enlightenment fashion that "beliefs and concepts are not
merely to be evaluated by the criteria implicit in the
practice of those who hold and use them." ( 1964,
67) In criticizing Peter Winch's The Idea of a Social
Science, Macintyre faulted Winch for failing to see
that we are able "to invoke criteria which can be understood independently of any particular way of
life." (1967, 129)
So Macintyre might claim that he is a former
card-carrying member of the Enlightenment tradition. Then he could say that he has witnessed the
collapse of this tradition, as required, from within.
9

Thus, he can rationally aver that the Enlightenment
tradition has collapsed under an epistemological
crisis for which it has no solution. This done , he
can picture us all as rationally required to find
something else.
Enter only now his allegiance to Thomism.
Thomism's explanations of the failure of the Enlightenment are exactly what a new tradition is supposed to supply to refugees from a failed tradition.
His Thomist theory of the rationality of traditions
now provides an explanation how (through learning
a "second first language"-Chapter XIX) we are
able to become adherents of a new tradition. He
himself has converted to Aristotelianism and Augusuman Christianity as understood through
Thomism, and now it is out of that tradition that he
seeks to explain the failures of the Enlightenment
and to show the resources Thomism has for handling the problems the Enlightenment could not handle.
In some respects, I suspect this is what Macintyre
wanted to think he was doing. It is only on the
penultimate pages of this book that he confesses his
allegiance to Thomism. Only there does he write
that "the point in the overall argument has been
reached-it may indeed have been reached somewhat earlier-at which it is no longer possible to
speak except out of one particular tradition in a
way which will involve conflict with rival traditions."
(401)

But, by his own account of rationality, this will
not do. It will not do because what we have is simply one philosopher's narrative of his own intellectual, moral, spiritual, and political pilgrimage. The
rationality of traditions, however, will not accept
first-person accounts of the truth. (cf. 270 & 290ff.)
What is needed is that somehow the whole social,
intellectual, and political practice of the Enlightenment tradition should grind to a halt in its crisis.
The heirs of the Enlightenment need all together to
see the failure of the tradition and its inability to
develop. There certainly are many post-Enlightenment moderns who currently despair over the future of the Enlightenment tradition. But, by Macintyre's own account, Enlightenment liberalism is indeed a tradition. Furthermore, many of its adherents have strategies for coping with its crisis. Relativism is one strategy, and Macintyre himself argues that, from the perspective of the Enlightenment tradition, relativism and perspectivism have a
strong claim to be developing the tradition . (It
would require another essay for me to argue that
there are much stronger contenders in the tradition
than relativism and perspectivism.) In other words,
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he himself acknowledges that many within the tradition are not ready to make the pilgrimage he
himself has made.
Perhaps, then, he is predicting that eventually
history will show that the Enlightenment tradition
has reached its dead end, and he is inviting the
more perceptive among us to join him in elaborating a different, more vital tradition. But it is precisely at this point that Macintyre falls right back
into the crucial problem with which he says the Enlightenment confronts us. The problem is, how can
I rationally choose among competing traditions?
Macintyre has argued that in the long view of history we can sometimes see some traditions collapsing while others make progress. But he knows as
well as we do that usually we must make choices before the results of history are in.
What advice does his theory of the rationality of
traditions give us for our actual situation? It tells us
not to look for standards of rationality outside' of a
given tradition. No rationality outside the tradition
is Macintyre's counterpart to extra ecclesiam nulla
salus. His theory seems to advise us vigorously to
participate in our own native tradition so long as it
has hope of making progress. But he provides few
internal means for urging us that it is currently rational to abandon the Enlightenment, let alone to
turn to Thomism.
Macintyre's final chapter, "Contested Justices,
Contested Rationalities," more or less acknowledges
that after all, as the Enlightenment tradition has
been wont to claim, choice of a tradition is actually
a prerational decision. In modern life persons are
confronted by the claims of many different traditions. "How is it rational to respond to them? The
initial answer is: that will depend upon who you are
and how you understand yourself." (393) Macintyre
observes that some people are already, prior to a
rational decision, participating in a way of life that
embodies a particular non-Enlightenment tradition
of rationality. In the opening chapter he seemed to
dismiss them as fideists; here he invites them to see
themselves more fully in the light of their own tradition. Such persons should encounter more detailed expositions of their own tradition as "an occasion for self-recognition and self-knowledge."
What rationality then requires of such a person is that
he or she confirm or disconfirm over time this initial
view of his or her relationship to this particular tradition of enquiry by engaging, to whatever degree is appropriate, both in the ongoing arguments within that
tradition and in the argumentative debates and conflicts
of that tradition of enquiry with one or more of its rivals. (394)
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In other words, the rational thing for this person
to do will be to remain within the tradition that has
been his or her main way of life up to this point.
Presumably it only becomes time to leave the tradition if and when the tradition collapses under an
epistemological crisis. But on whose principles shall
our person judge that the tradition has collapsed?
Until the final death of the tradition, different
people within the tradition will make different
judgments about when to leave. Do I have resources within myself for judging when to leave?
That sounds too much like the Enlightenment. But
must I wait until all the proponents of my tradition
acknowledge defeat? Will this be rational?

But on whose principles shall I judge
that my tradition has collapsed? Do
I have resources within myself for
making that judgment? That sounds
too much like the Enlightenment. But
must I wait to leave a tradition until
all its other proponents acknowledge
defeat? Will that be rational?
The problems become even more interesting
when Macintyre envisions the poor modern soul
that is living in the Enlightenment error of clinging
to "standards of rational justification which the beliefs of no tradition could satisfy." (395) It is
claimed that such persons "cannot understand the
action of entering into any scheme of belief except
as an act of arbitrary will, arbitrary, that is, in that
it must lack sufficient supporting reasons." (396)
What now will be the rational thing for such persons to do? The Enlightenment tradition has, in
fact, developed several competing answers within it·
self for coping with this situation, including arguments that decisions do not necessarily have to lack
sufficient supporting reasons. Macintyre likes none
of these answers and seems to believe that a true
adherent of the Enlightenment tradition must confess that it has failed . Macintyre's own account of
what is rational follows readily enough from his
Thomistic account of the rationality of traditions.
Those poor modern souls, reading the New York
Times and dithering on the edges of many traditions, must "become able not only to recognize
tb;emselves as imprisoned by a set of beliefs which
lack justification in precisely the same way and to
the same extent as do the positions which they reDecember, 1988

ject but also to understand themselves as hitherto
deprived of what tradition affords, as persons in
part constituted as what they are up to this point by
an absence, but what is from the standpoint of traditions [i.e. Thomism] an impoverishment." (396)
But this ability, by Macintyre's own account, cannot be developed in some rational way. Instead
there is need for a change in the person "amounting to a conversion [echoes of Thomas Kuhn], since
a condition of this alienated type of self even finding a language-in-use, which would enable it to
enter into dialogue with some tradition of enquiry,
is that it becomes something other than it now is,
a [new] self able to acknowledge by the way it expresses itself in language standards of rational enquiry as something other than expressions of will
and preference." (397)
Note carefully that no rational principle is available whatsoever to convince these persons of their
need for conversion. Macintyre really has nothing
more to say to those who remain unconverted. He
can pity them for living in what, from his perspective, is "a fundamental incoherence which is too disturbing to be admitted u self-conscious awareness."
(397) From his Thomist perspective he can rail
against the "self-defined success" that heirs of the
Enlightenment think they achieve on their own
principles. He can shudder at and show disdain for
their way of life:
What Durkheim did not foresee was a time when the
same condition of anomie would be assigned the status
of an achievement by and a reward for a self, which
had, by separating itself from the social relationships of
traditions, succeeded, so it believed, in emancipating itself. This self-defined success becomes in different versions the freedom from bad faith of the Sartrian individual who rejects determinate social roles, the homelessness of Deleuze's nomadic thinker, and the presuppositiOn of Derrida's choice between remaining
"within," although a stranger to, the already constructed
social and intellectual edifice, but only in order to deconstruct it from within, or brutally placing oneself outside in a condition of rupture and discontinuity. What
Durkheim saw as social pathology is now presented
wearing the masks of philosophical pretension. (368ff.)

At this point, however, the rationality of traditions is no longer in place. By Macintyre's own account the Enlightenment has not been defeated
precisely because, however distasteful it may be to
a Thomist, the liberal tradition has resources for
defining in its own terms successful development of
the tradition. In strict logic, since · Macintyre believes the typical modern to be above all an inhabitant of this still-developing tradition, his rational advice to such a person must be to continue to de11
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velop that tradition in which his way of life moves.
In actual fact, however, Macintyre is convinced that
Thomism has exposed the fatal weakness of the Enlightenment, not simply relative to the Thomistic
way of life, but somehow more absolutely. Otherwise, why would he, when trying to show us how to
be rational, do that which his strict theory rejects,
i.e., invite us to judge our own tradition not from
within but from without?

Speaking as an Augustinian by way of
Martin Luther rather than Aristotle
and Thomas Aquinas, I find that
Macintyre is much too confident
that infused grace can make a
tradition morally and intellectually
righteous in the sight of God.
It is this difficulty in Macintyre's account of the
rationality of traditions that leads me to claim that
in actual practice he needs and uses resources taken
from the Enlightenment as well as from other traditions. In particular, his account requires amending
in the direction of recognizing that persons can and
do move back and forth in rational ways among traditions. They rationally assess traditions not simply
in terms of avoiding internal collapse but also in
terms of a straight-up comparison between two or
more traditions in which they are able to become
simultaneously and yet significantly involved . I
would think that Thomas Aquinas himself is an excellent example of someone doing this.
Development of this line of thought is beyond the
scope of this essay, so I conclude with a few summary comments. First, from the perspective of
philosophy, I agree with the contemporary
philosopher and social critic Ernest Gellner who
writes that it seems "fairly obvious that intellectual
traditions inspired by the Cartesian-empiricist virtues, aspiring to atomism, to the breaking up of
questions, to abstention from intellectual package
deals, to the separation of truth from identity, fact,
and value, are, by and large, traditions which have
not only been markedly more successful in their
cognitive endeavours, but have also been associated
with social orders more attractive and acceptable
than their rivals, judging by the manner most of
mankind votes 'with its feet,' by its concrete
choices."
Here is an heir of the Enlightenment who has
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learned something about the importance of traditions, but who also is unwilling to let a theory like
Macintyre's encase us too narrowly within one systematic way of life and thought. Beware of intellectual, social, and political package deals! The Enlightenment's high standards of rational justification
may, after all, serve an important purpose. Interestingly, Gellner's own recommendation of Cartesianempiricist virtues is based upon an appeal to the intellectual and social practices and successes of the
Enlightenment tradition.
Speaking as an Augustinian by way of Luther
rather than Aristotle and Thomas, I find that
Macintyre is much too confident that infused grace
can make a tradition morally and intellectually
righteous before God. The traditions of men are attempting to nullify the Word of God. (Mark 7:13)
The details of Macintyre's Thomistic account of
morality and justice leave little room for a Lutheran's "bold sinning" or the notion that we are "simultaneously sinners and saints." In other words , while
the Thomist does indeed acknowledge the grace of
God, once the grace has been infused, it seems both
possible and necessary that the Kingdom of God
should be set forward in a divine package deal on
earth. This seems to me an unrealistic and dangerous position both for philosophers and for believers. (To his credit Macintyre does note that, among
other things, both Kant and Lutheran theology
need to be dealt with somewhere on down the line.)
( 11)
I say all this realizing fully that I am judging one
tradition in the light of the principles of others. In
fact, I think Macintyre has been doing the same,
and we should learn from his example rather than
his theory . The "rationality of traditions" needs to
learn something from the Enlightenment about the
ideal and the reality of rational argument across the
lines of traditions.
Cl
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Ernest l. Simmons

A LUTHERAN VIEW OF CHRISTIAN
VOCATION IN THE LIBERAL ARTS-I
Martin Luther on the Calling of the Christian

(Editor's Note: This is the first part of a two part essay.)

Throughout its history the Lutheran Tradition
has had a strong emphasis upon education, first of
all for the preparation of clergy and then for political leaders and the general population. This emphasis came from Luther's understanding that the
Christian is to be actively involved in the world and
by so doing exercise his or her Christian vocation as
a way of being a co-creator with God in sustaining
the creation itself. In later Lutheranism, however, a
duality developed between faith and life such that
vocation became primarily identified with one's occupation (Lutheran Orthodoxy) or with personal
piety (Lutheran Pietism). It is not so much that
these interpretations were wrong as that they were
incomplete (Kolden, p. 382).
These changes, along with other forces such as
the Enlightenment, helped to create the more secular understanding of vocation that we find in this
century. This in turn has directly affected liberal
arts study because in more recent years there has
developed a strong emhasis upon career and job
preparation on the part of undergraduate students.
While this is understandable it has, because of a
separation from its theological roots in the doctrine
of vocation, led to a reduction in the significance of
liberal arts study and to the unnecessary separation
of one's religious convictions from one's life in the
workaday world . Indeed it has even led to seeing
college study itself as a "holding pattern" away from
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the "real world" where people can begin to exercise
their opportunities and responsibilities.
The thesis of this essay is that scholarship itself is a
spiritual endeavor and therefore an acceptable expression
of Christian vocation, thus helping to correct the occupationalism of our time and strengthen the value of liberal arts education. In light of this vocational understanding of scholarship, it will be argued that students are exercising their Christian vocation while
studying in an undergraduate liberal arts context,
and that this is a valid expression of their vocation
apart from whatever particular callings they pursue
upon graduation. It is hoped that this brief essay
will not only show the value of Christian vocation
for understanding liberal arts study, but also affirm
that vocation on the part of both facu lty and students in undergraduate liberal arts education .

Scholarship is a spiritual endeavor
and an expression of Christian
vocation. It can help to correct
today's occupationalism and strengthen
the value of liberal arts education.
Clearly there is much that could be said concerning the understanding of vocation from many d ifferent disciplines, and I will make no attempt to be
exhaustive in this essay. Rather I will highlight
some of the historical and theological issues which
I believe help in understanding where we have
come from and perhaps where we might head . By
focusing upon Luther's understanding of vocation it
is not assumed that he has the final word on all
matters; certainly some necessary changes must be
made between his time and ours. His work forms
the basis of this essay because of the historical tradi13
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tion of which Lutheran colleges are a part and the
significant contributions that Lutheranism has made
to higher education in general.
There are many issues facing undergraduate liberal arts education, and this essay is focusing only
on one of them, namely the issue of "occupationalism." In light of this focus, the essay will
be divided into three sections: first of all, "Luther
on Christian Vocation"; second, "Scholarship as a
Spiritual Endeavor"; and finally, "Christian Vocation in the Liberal Arts." It is hoped that a broader
consideration of the Christian understanding of vocation can provide a framework not only to confront the dualistic thinking of many of our students
but also to place their scholarly work in a more inclusive and edifying context.
I

Before turning to a discussion of Luther's concept of Christian vocation it would be helpful to
briefly review the biblical understanding of this concept. In the biblical witness the primary word used
to express vocation is the word meaning "to call"
(IDB , p . 791), explicitly associated with a call from
God. The calling of God always proceeds from
God 's grace and is an invitation to participate in the
blessings of God's creation through that same grace.
It is not a call out of the world but into it and, especially in the Old Testament, it is corporate (Kittel,
pp. 488, 491).
Indeed , in the Hebraic understanding, the fundamental purpose of human creation is to give glory
to God, humanity's creator, and this is principally
done in this life. God's purpose in the creation is
shalom, which is peace incarnated in love through
justice, a love providing all that is necessary for life.
Following upon this understanding of God's activity, then , Dorothy Soelle observes that "whatever
meaning we find in the concept of creation, in ·a
creator, and in our having been created hinges on
love. The concept of creation is rendered empty
and meaningless if it is not out of love that God
created the world" (p. 16). This creation out of love
then elicits a loving response on the part of the
creatures created out of love. Thus one can view
the calling from God to ultimately be the reciprocation of God's love in the world through human imaging of his love. If we are created in the image of
God and God is love and the work of creation is a
work of love, then we are called to embody love in
our work in the world as well.
One of the direct consequences of love is of
course also justice, so that as Soelle reminds us our
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works of love in the world must also be works of
justice and liberation (Chaps. 2-4). Thus the call of
God touches all that we do in life, especially our
work. This concept of call then places all earthly
human endeavor in a theological, or transcendent,
context in light of which it derives its ultimate significance. It is precisely the loss of this context that
threatens us today, changing an incarnational notion of vocation based upon the call of God into
primarily a carnal one based on material satisfaction .
When one turns to the New Testament one finds
in the person of Jesus Christ the complete embodiment of this biblical vision of vocation. Jesus was
called by God and fulfills the promises of God upon
the understanding of which vocation rests. As the
book of Genesis, chapter one, relates, the whole creation is voiced forth from the word of God, and St.
John ( l: l-14) records that this word, this logos, is
one with God and is God and has entered into
human flesh. This is to say that the whole of creation is Christocentric in that as the second person
of the Trinity the logos was the means for the creation, and this very principle of creation within God

Little Boy Blue
North from Heron, looking for redneck
pheasants flushed out of corn stubble, I
first glimpse the blue sleeves flapping in
the Christmas wind. Turning back, I slowly
approach the figure, wishing it a clay
mummy. Hair grows on the little knuckles
instead. A cloaked child has fallen dead to
me. Pathologists tell me the body is bathed
in rich mineral salts, has perfect milk
teeth and healthy bones. There's no inkling
of foul play. His face I remember peacefully
sleeping, abandoned by his keepers. Lost on
a highway beneath the cold Nebraska stars they
wept, gently laid the lad to rest, his hand
put over his heart. Since in my dreams , I watch
the Christ child naked, crying in straw and the
hot vapor of stable beasts. Stumbling outside,
as faroffl can see, miles of hoary fields where
nothing even on a prayer lives through the night.

Edward C. Lynskey
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then also though the incarnation enters into the
creation which it has made possible.
The Creator becomes one with the creation. The
principle impelling both creation and incarnation is
the divine love of God so that all existence, then, is
a symbiosis, a life together, in love proceeding from
the love of creation and reconciled and restored
through the incarnation of that love in Jesus Christ.
Such was Jesus' calling, and the Christian calling
then follows upon this symbiosis. The Christian is
called (klesis, as Paul uses the term , see Romans 8:30
and I Cor. 7:20) to then trust in this promise of
God through faith and live out this faith through
loving service to one's neighbor through symbiotic
life in the world.
As this understanding of the Christian call developed down through the centuries, particularly
with the rise of the monastic movements, it became
increasingly identified with specific "religious" callings. One sees this in Augustine's Confessions, where
to follow one's Christian calling is to seek "Christian
perfection" (Gengenbach 1987, pp. 7-8) a pursuit
not available to the ordinary person, for one had to
leave "worldly" occupations to pursue them. In an
excellent article in these pages written shortly before her death , Constance Gengenbach observed
that "by the latter Middle Ages the very words vocatio and Ruf meant the official calling of a candidate
to a clerical benefice by those who had power of
ecclesiastical appointment. Christian vocation was
thus split off from the ordinary life of human beings in the world" ( 1987, p. 8) .
It was this separation of the Christian calling
from the world which Martin Luther and the Reformation was radically to change. It may be that
Luther's particular contribution in the understanding of the Christian calling was to connect it specifically to one's station or work in life (Kittel, pp.
492-93). In a very real sense the Reformation, by
emphasizing the priesthood of all believers and denying any superiority to specifically "religious" vocations, brought about a secularization of the understanding of vocation, and by so doing returned it to
its original biblical roots.
One of the primary bases for the understand;ng
of the Christian calling and vocation is the role of
hope, the impact of the transcendent future upon
present action, and it is this emphasis which Luther
explicitly develops in his understanding of the two
rules or kingdoms of God .
Luther was a relational thinker. He saw all
human life as existing simultaneously in relationship with God and neighbor, so all discussion of
human life, including the life of faith , is to be exDecember, 1988

pressed through a dialectical understanding. It is
the simultaneity of these relationships which gives
human life its tension but also its ultimate meaning.
The relationship before God (coram Deo) is one
maintained by God's grace alone and trusted in by
the Christian through faith. The Christian relates to
God, for Luther, though faith alone (sola fide). That
is not the end of the relationships, however, for the
Christian also lives in the worlds of nature and history so that there is a relationship to the world
(coram mundo) which is maintained in love.
For Luther one relates to God through faith and
to one's neighbor through love (Luther, "Lectures
on Galatians," perhaps the most comprehensive
single presentation of his theology. See Kolden, p.
384.). What this means then is that vocation belongs
exclusively to this world. We do not, for Luther,
exercise our vocation in order to please God or for
entrance into the world to come, but rather, following the Old Testament emphasis, vocation is for this
life and is done primarily for neighbor (Wingren,
pp. 11-12). This is where the two kingdoms understanding enters in.
In the kingdom of the world to come (God's future kingdom and the ground for Christian hope),
God rules directly through the Gospel and the law
does not function, for it has been fulfilled. The
Christian in the world today lives in anticipation of
this kingdom but is still in this world indeed living
as a justified sinner. This future kingdom overlaps
with the world of today precisely in the lives of individual Christians. For Luther, there is nothing
that particularly distinguishes Christians from nonChristians in regard to life in the present world. All
stand under the command and judgment of the law
both in its civil use (the first use) to maintain order
in society and in its theological use (the second use)
to convict of sin.
It is particularly in relation to the first use of the
law that Luther understands the role of Christian
vocation in the world of today. The first use of the
law is grounded in the order of creation itself,
whereby there is a creation rather than a chaos.
The biblical understanding of this order in creation
is that God continues to maintain the creation, even
uphold it, in the face of chaos so that creation is
understood as ongoing (creatio continua) and not an
over and done, one-and-for-all occurrence. Drawing
upon this understanding, Luther sees the first use
of the law as grounding "stations" or "offices" in society in which humans can participate with God in
continuing the creation. This is one of the functions
of being created in God's image, that humans become co-creators with God in sustaining the crea-
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tion itself.
Christian vocation then follows the demands of
the law, both natural and civil, in maintaining nature and society. Here is where the Christian's calling to loving service is expressed. Vocation for
Luther, as Wingren brings out, is more then just
one's occupation-it entails all that one does in the
world. Vocation includes personal, communal, and
historical relationships as well as occupational. (Wingren, Part 1.) Kolden summarizes this understanding concisely when he states:

Luther's answer to the Christ-and-culture question was
that of a dynamic, dialectical thinker. Its reproductions
by many who called themselves his followers were static
and undialectical. They substituted two parallel
moralities for his closely related ethics. As faith became
a matter of belief rather than a fundamental , trustful
orientation of the person in every moment toward God,
so the freedom of the Christian man became autonomy
in all the spheres of culture. It is a great error to confuse the parallelistic dualism of separated spiritual and
temporal life with the interactionism of Luther's gospel
of faith in Christ working by love in the world of culture (p. 179).

Vocation belongs to our situation between baptism and
the final resurrection-a situation in which there are
two kingdoms (earth and heaven, in Luther's terminology), two contending powers (God and the devil), two
antagonistic components within the Christian person
(the old self and the new self), and when Christians are
involved in constant struggle. Vocation is our calling in
our situation in life, through which we serve God's creative work by being under the law. (p. 383).

This "parallelistic dualism" permitted the separation of religious reflection from society and was
only intensified by the intellectual developments of
the Enlightenment and later natural as well as social
scientific thought. Other branches of the Reformation, such as Calvinism, did not suffer the dualistic
fate which Lutheranism courted but rather succumbed to an equally dangerous collapse of the
separation of the two kingdoms into an implied
identification of religious election with success or
failure in this world. It was not Lutheran dualism
but the opposite stance in Calvinism that was responsible for the final conversion of work as a
Christian vocation into work as worldly success
(Gengenbach, 1987, p. l 0; see also the works of
Weber and Tawney).

The world of today is not a neutral place, but
rather one of competing and conflicting powers in
which struggle is a daily experience. It is for this
reason that Luther argued against leaving the world
for the cloister, for this would be to abdicate one's
calling to serve God against the forces of destruction present in the world. Vocation is for the earth
and the world of today so that as Gustaf Wingren
summarizes, "Human action is a medium for God's
love to others." (Wingren, p. 180.)
Luther did not have a dualistic conception of
Christian life but rather a dialectical one. It is this
dialectival movement which allowed him to see the
action of God in the world even when this action

was hidden behind the "masks" (larvae) of God in
creation. This dialectical tension allows the Christian to live both in the world of today and the world
to come and to immerse him/herself in the life of
this world through Christian freedom. Such is the
power of faith in life.
It is the tragedy of later Lutheranism that it became uncomfortable with this dialectical tension and
collapsed it into a dualism which saw vocation as
personal spirituality and left the public sphere to
the devil or to secular authority alone (which at
times in western history has amounted to the same
thing). In Lutheran orthodoxy this dualism led to
political quietism which did not see a necessary
prophetic voice to be uttered in the area of public
policy or social matters. Later pietism, on the other
hand, turned inward to a personal understanding
of the call which saw it primarily in relationship to
God and not to neighbor. H. Richard Niebuhr summanzes this condition:
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It is the tragedy of later Lutheranism
that it became uncomfortable with
luther's dialectical tension and
collapsed it into a dualism which saw
vocation as personal spirituality and
left the public sphere to the devil or
to secular authority alone (which has
often amounted to the same thing).
Needless to say neither Luther nor Calvin would
have supported the later developments made from
their thought, but this history of transformation has
brought us to the present day where vocation has
become synonymous with occupation and the primary value of occupations is defined in financial
terms. It is this condition which is now so perniciously intruding itself into undergraduate liberal
arts education, seeing it primarily as glorified technical training to get the "better" jobs and not seeing
it as preparation for life itself and ongoing contributions of service to one's neighbor. Scholarship
then becomes seen as a technical endeavor rather
The Cresset

than a spiritual activity giving glory to God. One of
the tasks of Christian liberal arts study is to retrieve
this spiritual understanding, and to that we will
turn in the second part of the essay.
~=
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Stars
In a stellar performance of "We three Kings,"
our Sunday School class of seven
sang "star of wonder, star of night."
But for us, all stars were night stars,
wonder-full holes of glory
in an endless black umbrella.
At Boston University, the stars
had shot light years away
and shone by day as well as night.
They were out there by the millions,
our own low-voltage Sun just one of them,
if only one had the faith of a telescope.
In World War II, stars warred
in rank insignias of generals. Stars shone,
too, as out-of-this-world entertainers
visiting the far-flung, ill-starred troops.
At Acme Advertising, the stars
all gleam from heavenly Hollywood
or stud-starred Super-Bowls.
The skies dim ever darker over
the star-struck palaces of our Jerusalems.
I set an ancient silver star atop our tree,
humming "Star of wonder, star of night .

Bernhard Hillila
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Homage to a
Great Communicator
Richard Lee
Three years ago, during voluntary servitude as Acting Chairman of the University's fledgling
Department of Communication, a
genial colleague tried to cheer me
up. "At least your job of recruiting students is a cinch. Your best
recruiter is Ronald Reagan. No
President in living memory could
so clearly sell students on a career
in communication-and the success that comes from becoming a
great communicator."
Our Department of Communication in fact now bulges with
eager students-no thanks to me
nor, I think, to President
Reagan-but my colleague's teasing and tempting consolation
comes back to me now for some
reflection as a grateful nation
prepares to bid Ronald Reagan
farewell at the end of his extraordinary presidency.
When President Reagan ts
praised as "the great communicator" our Communication
students probably should see that
praise placed exactly where it's
due. This sobriquet was given

Richard Lee, a former Editor of
The Cresset, is Professor of
Humanities in Christ College at Valparaiso University.
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Reagan by his fe llow communicators in the media, not by
academia, and the two estates
often disagree upon what makes
good, much less great communication. The media tend to focus
on the packaging of the message
and its marketability, and the
academy tends to focus on the
consistency and truthfulness of
the message and its adequacy to
the problems it addresses.
For example, a communication
student probably should learn
that President Reagan, for all his
considerable gifts as a communicator, was not a particularly
accomplished rhetorician. In the
academy rhetoric is not salesmanship, it is moral leadership. It is
the art of persuading people toward the good or the better in
matters
requmng
difficult
choices. It takes little rhetorical
skill to persuade most Americans
to pump-prime the economy with
tax cuts, military spend-ups, and
masstve deficits. In his fiscal
rhetoric, Reagan never advocated
a painful course of action for the
long-term good of the country,
and too often he greatly communicated promises of a painless
prosperity which were too good
to be true.
This rhetorical fai lure is measured in part by the tripled national debt, the decline of the
country from the world's largest
creditor to the largest debtor, and
the tri llion dollars of foreign capital flooding the country to buy
up our assets and buoy up our
economy. The Reagan legacy of
debt "up to our great-grandchildren's ears" should surely force
some hard choices upon the next
President (and Congress), who
will need genuine rhetorical gifts
to commend sacrifice to the
American people.
If his mettle as a rhetorician
would not earn Reagan the title
of "the great communicator,"

neither probably wou ld his skills
as
a
debater,
teacher,
or
preacher. His skills as a debater
suffered from too much forgetfulness of the facts (and sometimes the arguments) at issue in
the few occasions in which he debated, and his grasp of some issues was rather limited by his
ideology. The give and take of
debate-or even a news conference-too often left Reagan
waffling or reduced to zingers,
one-liners, or endearing but unilluminating anecdotes.
When he was unopposed by an
adversary, however, and with a
script in hand, Reagan possessed
truly remarkable skills as a controversialist and
provocateur,
especially on radio and TV.
While the disarray and decline of
the Democratic Party was obviously to his advantage, one cannot gainsay his own impressive
achievement in redefining the national debate of this country. The
completion of the conservative
hegemony in American public
discourse ts Reagan's signal
achievement.

The title, "Great
Communicator," was
given Reagan

by his

fellow communicators
in the media.
As the nation's teacher Reagan
gets half marks, partly because he
held too few press conferences
where he could be questioned
and partly because he was too
disengaged from his own administration to transmit much reliable
information about what it was
doing. One felt he was too often
surprised by what was in fact
happening in his own administration and too inclined to defend
the indefensible when it was
The Cresset
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known. Reagan was much better
as the nation's preacher and
genuinely seemed to enjoy the
bully pulpit. If his creed was a
rather narrow individualism and
not the whole vision of America,
he nevertheless revitalized that
part of our public faith which believes in personal responsibility,
private enterprise, the work ethic,
technological progress, and a
"peace-keeping" military presence
in the world. Gradually, however,
his moral admonitions became
risible in the light of the corruption and contempt for the law in
his own administration, and after
Iranamok he was left largely
preaching to the choir. His gospel
of getting the government off
our backs came to mean a glaring
lack of law enforcement within
the government itself.

Reagan's achievement is
that he was able to be a
grandfatherly Eisenhower
for those of us longing
for Fifties' assurances.
Where, I suspect, the Communication student should most
clearly see the President earning
his title as "the great communicator" would be in a kind of
genius no Department of Communication can teach. That
gemus was Reagan's special kind
of national story telling in which
unpleasant present realities are
narrated into bearability and a
rosy vision of the future of the
country releases its citizens' energies for genuine achievements.
This symbolic triumphalism was
the narrative subtext in all his
speaking, and his best communication in word, image, and personal example was doubtless the
regeneration of the American
Dream itself. Not since F.D.R. has
December, 1988
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there been such a triumph of
personality in the presidency and
such persuasive narration of the
American Dream for a majority
of American citizens.
"Mankind," said T. S. Eliot,
"cannot bear too much reality."
There is nothing necessarily perverse in the President redeeming
reality with a story. The bald, unmediated reality for the United
States in recent years has been a
relative decline in national power.
Emerging from World War II as
the world 's preeminent economic
and military giant and in apparent control of world affairs,
America has more recently experienced a slow erosion of that
power-or a more competitive
world in which to exercise that
power. The two-income family
now required to enjoy the same
standard of living one income
supported in the 50s and 60s is
writ large in the nation as a
whole which must double its efforts to remain even in a more
competitive world economy.
This recent decline in American power is marginal, but it is
real. (Fortunately, in the same
period, the power of the Soviet
bloc declined more seriously into
political fragmentation and economic
exhaustion .)
Reagan's
steady narration of an America
ever renewing itself during this
period
undoubtedly
difficult
helped many Americans get
through a troubled time and may
have bought some time for us to
work on our competitive problems.
Reagan's achievement as "the
great communicator" is that he
was able to be a grandfatherly
Eisenhower for those of us longing for the assurances of the 50s
and a big brotherly mentor for
entrepreneuring yuppies seeking
the economic adventures of the
80s. Both old and young could
find a place for themselves in the

triumphant national story told by
a President who himself seemed
both old and young, if not immortal, at once.

What the American
people heard in the
Reagan narration of the
nation's story was hope
in the midst of decline.
It is true that some polls show
astonishingly little commitment to
many of Reagan's actual policies,
but my own view IS that
Reaganism has more staying
power, especially in foreign affairs, than the polls suggest. Certainly his personal consolation
can be that he retains the love of
the majority of the electorate as
he
leaves
office-no
mean
achievement in the modern
American presidency. Indeed, it
seems clear that the lingering affection
for
Reagan
and
Reaganism played no small part
in bringing a quite ordinary Presidential candidate and an undistinguished Vice-Presidential candidate of his party to electoral
victory.
What the American people
heard in the Reagan narration of
the nation's story was hope in the
midst of decline , action against
drift, cheer through adversity,
and an honest effort by an essentially decent President-who if he
did not always do well meant
well. A Comm unication student
probably should learn that the
solutions to our national problems will require more than a
Reaganesque capacity for telling
the American people their story
in ways in which they can hope
for the future. The student, however, should also learn that the
solutions will require nothing less.

••
••
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Private Parts
John Steven Paul
What a story! Shocking. Lurid.
Incredible. Laughable.
The kind of story made for,
and made up for , the theatre.
But there it is in the N ew York
Times on May 11 , 1986. "A
former French diplomat and a
Chinese opera singer have been
sentenced to six years in jail for
spying for China after a two-day
trial that traced the story of clandestine love and mistaken sexual
identity . . . . Mr. Bouriscot was
accused of passing information to
China after he fell in love with
Mr. Shi, whom he believed for
twenty years to be a woman."
What, David Henry Hwang
must have asked, could have underlay Monsieur Bouriscot's prodigious mistake? In his play M.
Butterfly, the Chinese-American
playwright proposes that the root
of
M.
Bouriscot's
problem
(Bouriscot is here transformed
into Rene Gallimard) was his obsession with Giacomo Puccini's
popular operatic masterpiece,
Madama Butterfly. M. Butterfly
opened in New York in February
and, after garnering several prestigious awards including the An-

John Steven Paul is Associate Professor in Communication and Director
of the University Theatre at Valparatso University.
20

toinette Perry Award for best
play, it is still running on Broadway.
M. Butterfly is a wonderfully
theatrical and deeply disturbing
play about . human relations of
several kinds, from intimate to international. It is a play about
power and violation; about deception, rape, and, perhaps most
disturbingly, about the power of
art.
What could be less disturbing
than listening to a performance
of Madama Butterfly? Of course,
Puccini has his detractors. But for
amateur aficionados, those of us
who are undyingly grateful to
Texaco for sponsoring the Metropolitan Opera on the radio,
Butterfly is hard to beat: a thrilling tenor-baritone duet in the
first act, an ecstatic soprano aria
in the second, and a tragic suicidal death in the third. Listening
to David Belasco's tragic play set
to Puccini's most emotionally
compelling music is simply one of
the joys of life-especially when it's
sung in Italian. Yes, many of us
in the audience share a common
pleasure with wretched Rene Gallimard, sitting in his Parisian
prison cell.
For those not familiar with Butterfly, Gallimard tells it-no, acts
it out-with musical illustration
played on the little tape recorder
that his jailers have allowed him
to have. Now we are confronted
with the story in English, or
should we say "American."
In Madama Butterfly, the Yankee lieutenant Benjamin Franklin
Pinkerton comes to Nagasaki,
"having wandered the earth casting anchor where and when it
suits him, until he runs into a
storm and then life isn't worth
living unless he can lavish himself
with the best of the pleasures and
loves of the country in which he
happens to find himself." Putting
his philosophy into action , Pin-

kerton has secured both a beautiful house and wife, Cho-Cho-San,
who is the epitome of delicate
and mysterious femininity. She is
known as "Madame Butterfly."
Pinkerton is pleased with both
his acquisitions, but he has no intention of lighting for longer
than it pleases him to do so. He
tells the American consul, Sharpless, that this arrangement will
serve his purpose until he officially marries a women in the
United States. Shortly after the
ceremony, Pinkerton leaves Japan
and Cho-Cho-San, who pines for
him. Her faithful servant Suzuki
tries to tell her mistress that her
husband will never return, but
she will hear none of it. She has
renounced her native religious
traditions in deference to Pinkerton's Christianity, borne him a
child, turned down a marriage
proposal from one of her distinguished countrymen, and pondered suicide should her American husband never return.

M. Butterfly is a play
about power and
violation; about
deception, rape, and,
perhaps most strikingly,
about the power of art.
Pinkerton does return and he
is indeed married , but to an
American women named Kate.
Cho-Cho-San offers her son to
Kate, on the condition that Pinkerton himself come to take him.
By the time Pinkerton arrives,
Butterfly is in the throes of death
from a self-inflicted knife wound.
The Yankee can only cry "Butterfly."
The tale of Madame Butterfly,
beautifully tragic at a distance, is
rather revolting up close. And in
Gallimard's vernacular rendition
The Cresset

the story is disqusting.
Gallimard now acts out the role
of Pinkerton as a world-traveling
voluptuary, a coarse and contemptible Don Juan in a military
uniform, who uses his position to
satiate his sexual appetite. Right
now he wants an "oriental girl.
They want to be treated bad!
And when I leave, she'll know
what its like to have been loved
by a real man ."
This is old Gallimard's story
told in retrospect from his prison
cell, where he wallows in selfloathing and self-pity. But as a
diffident, awkward, and sexually
frustrated young man, Gallimard
treasured Puccini's opera. To him
it was a fantasy of a confident
man-of-the-world,
easy
with
women, who sought and secured
the love of a perfect woman, a
woman whose primary objective
was to please a man, to respond
to his every request.
In 1960, Gallimard was a
member of the French diplomatic
service stationed in Beijing. He
had, he thought, given up his
pursuit of the Butterfly fantasy .
He married a woman much older
than himself and invested his
passion in his work. Then, at
another of an endless succession
of embassy parties, a Chinese
opera singer, Song Liling, sings
Madame Butterfly's death aria.
Gallimard is swept away by the
performance. When he manages
to speak with the singer, however, she bluntly tells him she detests Butterfly as a Western Fantasy of the "submissive Oriental
woman and the cruel white man":
"Consider it this way: what would
you say if a blonde homecoming
queen fell in love with a short
Japanese businessman? He treats
her cruelly then goes home for
three years, during which time she
prays to his picture and turns
down marriage to a young Kennedy. Then when she learns he has
remarried , she kills herself. Now , I
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believe you would consider this girl
to be a deranged idiot, correct?
But because it's an Oriental who
kills herself for a Westener-ah!you find it beautiful."

Tough and worldly as this butterfly is, Gallimard is infatuated
with her. He goes first to see her
at the Chinese opera and then to
her apartment. Gradually they
develop an intensely loving relationship. Song plays out her
role of Gallimard's ancient and
amorous fantasy.

Gallimard acts out the
role of Pinkerton as a
world-traveling
voluptuary, a coarse and
contemptible Don Juan
in a military uniform.

But if we had begun to be
happy for Gallimard, playwright
David
Hwang
introduces
Madame Chin to shove us backward for a view of the larger reality. As Cho-Cho-San was served
by Suzuki, Chin is Song Liling's
companion. A disciple of Chairman Mao and member of the
Communist revolutionary party,
Comrade Chin is really running
this show, and the actor Song Liling, a superb female impersonator, is her agent. Song pays
for his relatively independent
lifestyle with information. From
Gallimard, he has learned about
American troop strength in
Southeast Asia. The Party, barks
Chin, now wants information
about the planned American
bombing of Vietnam. As she
exits, she pointedly reminds
Comrade Song that "there is no
homosexuality in China."
Events speed by. Gallimard's
fortunes as a diplomat rise and
fall. His early predictions about

American military success in Vietnam turn out to be wrong. He
has a wild love affair with a
Danish student. His marriage
sours as he and his wife argue
about which of them is infertile.
Chairman Mao ages and the Cultural Revolution sweeps across
China.
Through it all, Song and Gallimard sustain their love. On the
pretext of modesty, Song insists
that they make love only in the
dark and that she remain clothed
throughout. The combination of
Song's expertise and Rene's passionate suspension of disbelief is
enough to convince him of her
femininity. Once, when Gallimard
insists that Song strip naked, the
wily actor gambles that all the
diplomat really wants is submission. Song obediently submits to
Rene's wish, but Gallimard is so
overcome with feelings of love
and guilt that he withdraws his
demand. Finally, Song claims to
be pregnant with Gallimard's
child; he begs to marry Song and
claim the child, but she refuses,
saying that they would be a burden to him.
Suddenly, Gallimard becomes a
liability to the French and he is
reassigned to low-level deskwork
in Paris. Song Liling is publically
humiliated by agents of the Cultural Revolution as a homosexual
and an actor, and is assigned to
field labor on a communal farm.
At the end of a four year "rehabilitation period," Comrade
Chin informs Song that he will be
sent to Paris, partly to rid China
of homosexual pollution and
partly to obtain further information from Gallimard. Fifteen
years after Song's arrival in China
and · Gallimard's happy reunion
with those he considered his wife
and son, the two were arrested
for stealing and dispatching classified information.
So, twenty-six years after the
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opening scene at an embassy
party in Beijing, their opera
reached its climax in a courtroom
in Paris. Unlike the tragic
Madama Butterfly, however, M.
Butterfly is an opera buffa, at
which Gallimard hears the whole
world laughing.
David Henry Hwang, the son
of first-generation immigrants to
California, is interested in much
more than the humiliation of a
French diplomat. Using Bouriscot's pathetic story as a platform
and Madama Butterfly as a
paradigm,
the
playwright
launches a dramatic meditation
on the minds and behavior of
white Western men as they roam
the world, especially the Oriental
world. The West comes to the
East with rape-mentality: "their
mouths say 'no,' but their eyes say
yes."
Hwang's central device is his
identification of Gallimard with
Puccini's Lieutenant Pinkerton,
the swaggering American military
officer. Hwang's Pinkerton is
nothing but a cad. He cares little
for the feeling and futures of
others, lest care interfere with
gratification and pleasure. Pinkerton, in Hwang's interpretation, is not a man of courage or
intellect, but a man of bounding
libido. He is a man defined, not
by his heart or mind, but by his
penis. And ultimately it is the
male sexual organ that is the central image and issue of M . Butterfly.
Even in our jaded society, a
serious play about a man's most
private part is more than just disturbing; it is, at least initially,
shocking. M. Butterfly is not a
lewd work , nor is David Henry
Hwang the first man of the
theatre to put the penis at the
center of a theatre piece. Classical
Greek comedy was derived from
fertility rites and phallic celebrations. The exposed, oversized
22

organ was a standard part of the
comic costume in the ancient
world. In the Greek theatre, the
erect phallus was a symbol of fertility, of life, a bringer of joy, a
reason for a party.

Playwright David Henry
Hwang, the son of
immigrants to
California, is
interested in much more
than the humiliation
of a French diplomat.
In M. Butterfly, however, the
male sexual organ becomes a
source of disappointment and an
object of ridicule. While Gallimard's passions are aroused by
Pinkerton's operatic conquest of
Butterfly, his own experience is
marked by sexual dysfunction,
impotence, and infertility. As a
boy he was obsessed with pornographic magazines, but as a
young man he couldn't get a
date. He entered into a loveless
marriage, and then was unable to
give his wife a child. While he is
in Beijing, Gallimard meets a
nineteen-year-old Danish woman
studying languages in China. She
is a Scandinavian stereotype: big,
beautiful, and blond. Her name is
Renee. Renee seduces Rene, and
in the moments after their first
time, Renee delivers a startlingly
contemptuous diatribe on male
penis anxiety. Ironically, Rene
carries on a strenuous liaison with
this woman who laughs at his
maleness.
In the ultimate deprecation of
male potency, Song Liling presents Gallimard with a child that
she says is his own. Actually, of
course, the baby has been obtained through the machinations
of a woman, Madame Chin, and

a homosexual. And, to make the
point a bit too clearly, Song insists that "their" baby be called
"Song Pee-Pee."
If we are to look for a classical
ancestor of M . Butterfly, we will
not find it in the fertility plays,
but in Aristophanes' Athenian
comedy Lysistrata. Lysistrata, an
Athenian woman, exasperated by
her soldier-husband's continual
absence, decides to end the war.
With the help of some female
comrades she captures the Acropolis and then calls a summit
conference of women from other
poleis. The women vow to refrain
from sexual relations with their
husbands until they agree to end
the war. When the men realize
they can no longer come home
on furlough to the sexual embraces of their wives, they give up
the fighting. One hilarious scene
of agony between a soldier and
his wife makes it clear that the
men do not end the war because
they love their wives, but because
their sexual needs are so great
that the frustration renders them
powerless. Thus, in Lysistrata, the
penis is not a symbol of veneration but a mark of weakness.
There is connubial feast at the
end of the play, but the characters celebrate more out of deference to comic convention then as
a salute to marital bliss.
Incidentally, Lysistrata has long
held its place in the canon of classical dramatic literature. The play
is full of sexual allusions, references, and repartee--costume
bulges, raised spears, etc. Unfortunately, audiences and producers have found its theme so disturbing and its action so indecent
that it is rarely produced without
a substantial sanitizing of the language and the mise-en-scene.
In M. Butterfly, as in Lysistrata,
the penis is the essence and symbol of maleness: a symbol of conquest, dominance , and violence.
The Cresset

The Pinkertons of the world have
not brought fertility and life; they
have, rather, violated and raped
whoever would submit. Yet the
men of both Lysistrata and M .
Butterfly are not to be feared but
to be laughed at.

The Pinkertons of the
world have not brought
fertility and life; they
have simply assaulted
whoever was available.
For John Dexter's production
at the Eugene O'Neill Theatre,
designer Eiko Ishioka has ringed
the stage opening with concentric
blood-red circles. A long ramp
begins high up on the right side
of the stage and gracefully circles
downward across the back of the
stage. Underneath the ramp are
spaces that house scenery and a
small orchestra. For most of the
play, these spaces are darkened;
the supporting structure of the
ramp is faced in black. The face
of the ramp, actually an inclined
plane descending from right to
left, takes the shape of a huge
phallus piercing the red orifice.
The attitude of the phallic shape
is not raised in celebration but
pointed, laterally, for violation .
As a theatre piece, M . Butterfly
is wonderfully, disconcertingly
fluid. Setting, action, and character are constantly changing in
front of our eyes. Walls become
transparent, prison cells become
embassy halls, characters move in
and out of historical contexts,
then becomes now, men become
women and women men. In the
intermission between Acts II and
III, B.D. Wong, the actor who
plays Song, takes off his extremely elaborate make-up and
dons an Armani suit. It is a stunning and complete transformaDecember, 1988

tion of the woman into the man.
As he sits in prison, Rene Gallimard is tortured by these whirling transformations. One horrid
fantasy is particularly haunting. It
is of Song confronting him as a
man and then stripping himself
naked in front of Gallimard, forcing Gallimard finally to see him
for what he is. When Rene sees
that his Butterfly is really and
only a man, a man with a penis,
he breaks down in anguished
laughter.
One
more
transformation
awaits
us.
Poor
Gallimard,
laughed out of his role as Pinkerton, has finally come to understand who he really is and has
been since his childhood. With
the help of two Kabuki-style
stagehands, Rene makes himself
over and dons the wig and costume of Cho-Cho-San, Madame
Butterfly. He begins the death
aria and stabs himself at its end.

From a great distance above,
Song looks on and whimpers lovingly, "Butterfly."
The reversal of Gallimard and
Song seems distracting at this
point. Hwang has made his
points well. Why does he risk undermining them by suggesting
that all that has gone before has
been only a matter of individual
psychic confusion? Does he really
mean to say that had Rene gotten
some therapy along the way, all
this might never have happened?
Notwithstanding his brilliant insights concerning the relationship
between women and men and
East and West, it is David
Hwang's invention of Gallimard's
operatic obsession that may finally be the powerful message of
M. Butterfly. What role does Art
play in the shaping of our consciousness? How wary ought we
to be of popular masterpieces like
Madama Butterfly-or Rambo?

C:

Dimension
Where is light so hard, so bold
As this light I remember
From late day, late year Florida
Except North, as far north as North
Where deep in ice, light carves
And shapes itself until shadows lift
The one side light has of itself
Like summer or winter moons rising,
Or even as mind rises and peers
From ground to horizon to learn
Dimension, to see half the world
Hidden like faith north and south
Of revelation. So we've stopped here,
Deep South; we'll go no further
Until the far side, the dark,
Falls deep into itself, as cold
Must fall, back into memory.

Robert Pawlowski
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The Lulling
Effect of Peace
Albert R. Trost
As 1988 rolls to an end, the
world looks more peaceful than it
has for many years.
One of the bloodiest and most
persistent wars, that between Iran
and Iraq, seems to have ended,
though bellicose talk and sometimes action is still heard in that
region. The war in Afghanistan is
also near an end as the Russians
continue a slow withdrawal from
that country, leaving mainly rival
groups of Afghans to work out
the peace. The withdrawal of
Cuba and South Africa from Angola, while less imminent than
the withdrawal of the Russians
from Afghanistan, is a distinct
possibility. That is so because the
Cubans and South Africans very
much want to withdraw, and
their respective supporters, the
Soviet Union and the United
States, want them to pull back as
well. Again, only the rival Angolan groups are unclear about
what they want to do. Even places
like Central America and Southeast Asia (centering on Kam-

Albert R. Trost is Professor and
Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Valparaiso University
and a regular contributor on political
affairs for The Cresset.
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puchea) have cooled a bit over
the past year as outside interests
(whether the United States, the
Soviet Union, or Cuba) display
diminished enthusiasm for aiding
clients in these regions. In none
of the above cases are all parties
gathered around a table at a public peace conference, but ceasefires and secret negotiations are
in the wind and they have had
their effects in less bloodshed on
the ground.
The most hopeful sign of all is
the one taking place inside of the
Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev
continues to press his case for reforms in the economy of the
USSR and in its domestic political
processes. He continues to press
his domestic opponents and to
score some victories over them.
These domestic developments in
the Soviet Union have had the effect of the Russians displaying
less activity and interest in the
rest of the world. There are still
grounds for optimism about the
prospects for further agreements
with the United States, and
perhaps even a general settling of
differences between the Soviet
Union and China. The Russians
appear to want the stability outside of their borders that such
agreements would bring.
This is not to say that peace is
everywhere breaking out. The
Middle East is as threatening as
ever. The Palestinians have revived, even though they are probably more isolated from neighboring Arab nations than ever before. They press their case
against the Israelis more radically
than they have since the early
1980s. Outside the Middle East,
Northern Ireland continues to
fester, and new civil unrest has
appeared in Burma, Algeria, and
Yugoslavia. Still, the overall impression is that a general condition of peace is closer than it has
been for many years.

The impression of peace is now
quite widespread. It prevails in
our
own
country,
extends
through Western Europe, reaches
to Japan , and may even be
acknowledged in the Soviet
Union. The main effect of the
impression that we are entering a
more peaceful world is that nations (not least the great powers)
and regions turn in on themselves. Domestic concerns move
to the fore. Mild forms of
nationalism and xenophobia become more evident. Talk of
globalism and interdependency
wanes.
Evidence of an inward turning
in the face of a presumably diminished external threat is clearly
present in our own country. We
have just concluded a presidential
election campaign where discussion of foreign policy issues was
minimal. The major substantive
issue in the campaign, if any,
concerned the optimal level of
government intervention in domestic economic and social issues.
What should the government do
about
crime,
unemployment,
housing, and education? These
were the topics. The term "liberal" became a code word for
more government intervention
(and spending).

The main effect of the
impression that we are
entering a more peaceful
world is that nations
(not least the great
powers) and regions
turn in on themselves.
The closest the campaign came
to a foreign policy issue involved
the drug problem. In a strange
twist, it was acknowledged as a
domestic concern, but was asThe Cresset

signed causes outside of our
country. The problem of drug
su pplies and even d rug dealing
was given a foreign cast. One of
the few places foreign aid or the
use of American troops overseas
came up was in connection with
dealing with the supply of drugs.
When international trade or
Japan was talked about during
the campaign, it was done with
the hint of protectionism fo und
in Richard Gephardt's earlier
brief cam paign for the presidency. T he only real mention of
Eu rope and our relations with
nations in that region came in the
context of spending less money
on defence there, and of the possibilities of an American troop
withdrawal from that region.
This was an election campaign, in
short, without any major foreign
policy iss ues, unless these could
be given a domestic or a
xenophobic slant. George Bush
d id not even seem to want to take
credit for the widespread peace
on be half of the previous Republican Administration. A claim for
credit for safe streets and domestic prosperity seemed enough.
Less obvious to us is how the
perception of growing peace has
affected Europe. Its clearest expression is the desire of Europeans to lessen their commitments to the Atlantic alliance and
to lessen their obligations to the
United States for our role in defending them. For over a decade,
there has been a large popular
movement to withdraw nuclear
arms from Europe. There is now
growing disenchantment with
American troops, bases, and conventional arms in Europe. Popular expressions of this disenchantment are strongest in Spain,
Greece, and West Germany . In
addition, there is large and growing pressu re to lower defence
budgets in almost every Western
European nation. For most EuroDecember, 1988

peans, peace cannot break out
too soon , in the sense that this
would mean the lowering of the
temperature of East-West confrontation.

For most Europeans,
peace cannot break
out too soon, in the
sense that this would
mean the lowering of the
temperature of EastWest confrontation.

It is also easy enough to see
some xeno phobia and nationalism
on the part of Europeans in their
reaction to fo reign workers. Its
latest and most graphic expression was in the 10 per cent of the
vote garnered by Mr. Le Pen in
the first round of the French
presidential elections. However,
this resentment of foreign workers can be fo und throughout
Western Europe, even in such
globally-oriented nations as Sweden and Denmar k. It would be
inplausible
to
link
this
xenophobic expression with the
break-out of peace elsewhere in
the world, but it is part of a general decline of globalism which
peace has other wise stimulated .
During the past year or two,
the most dramatic example of
Europe's inward-turning occurred at the regional level rather
than at the national level. This
was the re-invigoration of Europe's drive for economic integration through the vehicle of the
European Community, with a
goal of achieving a completely
unified internal market for the
twelve nations of the EC by 1992.
This market will include over 320
million people and will be the
largest tariff and restr iction-free

market in the developed world.
The accomplishments of the
European Community through
this year, and certainly the goals
it has set for itself by 1992, might
well be evaluated from the opposite perspective, i.e., as progress
away from
narrowness and
nationalism toward a more cosmopolitan
su pranationalism.
When the European Community
movement started in the early
1950s, its founders meant it to be
an attack on nationalism, which
they largely blamed for World
Wars I and II. The strategy in
this attack was to combine regionalism and functionalism as
the realistic way to build a Europe without national loyalties. A
regional focus of loyalty, Western
Europe, was considered a more
realistic focus for new loyalties
than
was
globalism.
The
functionalist approach stressed
solid economic accomplishments
for Europe before any attempt at
building integrated political institutions.
Solid economic achievements
were, in fact, the rule, from the
founding of the European Coal
and Steel Community in 1951
through the beginnings of the
European Economic Community
in 1957. A customs union on
coal, steel, and other industrial
products was achieved even
ahead of an ambitious timetable.
Indeed, so much progress was
made toward establishing a "common market" for industrial commodities that political integration
of Europe was pushed ahead. It
failed , however, first in the face
of De Gaulle and French
nationalism in the 1960s, and
then under the pressure of OPEC
and oil boycotts and price rises in
the 1970s.
Movement toward political integration of Europe stopped after
1965, but economic integration
went forward , and with it
25
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through the 1960s and 1970s economic growth and prosperity in
all the original six national members, as well as in Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, which were
added as members in the early
1970s. Both the question of oil
supply and the addition of the
three new members and their adjustment restrained supranational
political development through the
1970s. Then Greece was added to
the EC as a new member in early
1980, followed by Spain and Portugal in the mid-1980s . Some
political movement away from a
nation-state emphasis occurred in
1979 with the first direct elections
of a European Parliament. However, it was still the economic features of the European Community that attracted most support.

A more peaceful
international community
allows Europeans to
concentrate more on
building the European
Community. One hopes
they will not forget
the rest of the world.

all twelve nations. Only then
would goods and people be truly
competitive and restriction free in
all of the Community. Such a policy goal would seem to suggest
close coordination, even uniformity, of national policies, or even,
as was intended by the founders ,
a set of powerful and supranational European institutions. It is
to a unified internal market with
common policies that the twelve
have now committed themselves
by 1992.
1f the achievement of an integrated Europe with common
policies and institutions is seen as
a half-way house on the way to
the inclusion of more and more
territory and people, broadening
eventually beyond Europe, it can
be seen as making its own independent contribution to peace
and prosperity. If, on the other
hand , it is merely a new level of
exclusivity which rejects or closes
off the non-European world,
such a development is to be regretted.
When there was less peace in
the world, the European nations
had to worry more about their
global supplies of oil, the coordination of their respective foreign

policies with regard to warring
areas of the world, their relationship to the national security posture of the United States, and
their obligations and responsibilities toward their poorer
former colonies in Africa, Asia,
and the Caribbean. A more
peaceful and stable international
environment allows them to concentrate more on building the
European
Community.
One
hopes that caught up in their
present enthusiasm over 1992,
they will not forget the rest of the
world.
One hopes even more that we,
lulled by peace and distracted by
our domestic problems, and
turned-off by a new wave of antiAmericanism, will not forget
them. We have already seemed to
ignore a good portion of the
world. Weakening our historical
interest in Europe would be an
awful price to pay even for the
achievement of limited peace.
The real problems of the future
are still global ones: the disparity
of wealth between North and
South, environmental pollution,
and yes, even peace, the present
appearance of which is only temporary and illusory.
Cl

Give The Cresset As A Thoughtful Gift
In fact, it was the achievement
of almost all of the explicit economic objectives of the original
treaties setting up the Economic
Community that brought Europe
back in 1985-86 to the consideration of further political integration. A "common market" in the
sense of an absence of tariffs and
border controls on the movement
of goods and people among the
twelve nations had been achieved.
It was recognized that for even
further economic integration to
occur "common policies" in transport, money and banking, unemployment, social security, and
taxes would have to be passed in
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Moving Images
Edward Byrne
When cinema was invented, it was
initially used to record life, like an extension of photography. It became an
art when it moved away from the
documentary. It was at this point that
it was acknowledged as no longer a
means of min·oring life, but a
medium by which to intensify it.
-Francois Truffaut
There are more valid facts and details
in works of art than there are in history books.
-Charlie Chaplin

In 1888 a young inventor,
George Eastman, discovered that
flexible film made from a celluloid base could be marketed in
rolls for photography, replacing
the cumbersome glass plates previously used. That same year
Thomas Edison filed for a patent
to protect his notion that flexible
film could be used to create moving images as well as still pictures.
This patent led to the production
of the kinetoscope, a box containing a roll of flexible film to be
viewed individually by patrons
peering through peep-holes. It
is safe to say that this popular,
though primitive, invention was

Edward Byrne teaches English at
Valparaiso University and writes regularly on Film for The Cresset.
DecembeT, 1988

the forerunner to the modern
movie projector.
Now, one hundred years after
these innovations initiated a novel
manner of viewing the world
around us, a major industry supplying much of the world's entertainment, a new medium for
transmitting
information
throughout the world, and a
promising art form to interpret
man's position in the world, the
first national museum founded to
celebrate and conserve the history
of moving images has just opened
in New York City. The American
Museum of the Moving Image,
appropriately built within the
shell of an old movie studio in
Queens, is devoted to the presumption that film and television
are media which have influenced
our nation's development in the
twentieth century, to the preservation of unique, rare, and historical moving images which have
been recorded by these media,
and to the promotion of both
media as art forms to be recognized, respected, and rewarded.
As one reviews the procession
of national and global events as
well as the parade of social and
technological
advancements
which have evolved so swiftly in
the last century, one can watch
with wonder the growing power
and the elevated position media
of the moving image have assumed in today's world. But truly
no one should be surprised by
their rapid ris~ in popularity and
influence. Film and television
have emerged like butterflies
from cocoons, metamorphosed
from faint ideas in the minds of
a few to become the dominant
forms of art and communication
in the modern age.
Perhaps in the past couple of
decades the public personages
slowest to perceive the power of
the moving image and to acknowledge this ascendency m

rank by the media of the moving
Image to the rung where art
forms are offered ceremonious
assent have been some of our library
directors,
university
educators, and museum curators,
individuals who act as the keepers
of the culture, agents of art
whose agencies conventionally accord formal status to those works
which meet prescribed or customary standards. Nevertheless, an
ever-increasing number of our
nation's library stacks store videocassettes, and the silence of the
reading rooms is sometimes interrupted by the sounds emanating
from nearby video rooms. Additionally, in the hallowed halls of
our educational institutions film
studies and filmmaking have
begun to gain credibility as subjects for intellectual inquiry. Even
art museums have started to accommodate movie enthusiasts by
enlarging their stock of film classics, by restoring some silent
films, and by adding separate sections for screenings of film festivals and revival series.
However, despite the progress
seen in these recent developments, film always has been
viewed as an adjunct to the other
more acceptable arts, a subordinate form often used almost as a
loss leader. Its admission into the
art world has hinged upon its
overwhelming popularity; originally, film was permitted entrance with the basic purpose of
attracting new art advocates who
would not . otherwise express interest in the institutions. Furthermore, since television arrived 0{1
the scene nearly a half century
after film, this fledgling industry
has thus far received only a fraction of the respect film has
achieved. It has been clear all
along to many of the participants
in film and television that the
only way to overcome such a second-class status would be to
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exhibit superior and noteworthy
examples from the media of the
moving image in a setting of their
own. Finally, this has occurred.
Whether
the
American
Museum of the Moving Image
will succeed soon in attaining for
film and television an artistic
equivalence with the other forms
already held sacred by the American public is hard to say. When
movies and television programs
are easily accessible to the
populace in their own living
rooms, kitchens, and bedrooms,
and the act of viewing the two
media is part of our ordinary
daily or weekly routines, the mystique usually associated with great
art is easily stripped away. The
average individual can own a
printed reproduction of a Picasso
painting for hanging in the family hall or see a community rendition of a Shakespeare play on a
stage at the town hall , but both
experiences are far inferior to the
original intent of the artists.
However, when one catches a
film at a local movie theatre or
views a program on television,
the projection seen is exactly
what the director meant for the
audience to experience. In fact,
when observed in a museum setting, many of the television programs and movie productions
may appear out of place.
Ironically, the problem which
confronts the management of this
new museum may be unlike any
encountered by previous museum
administrators: contrary to the
tasks facing others in their position, they must convince the
public to re-examine as classic art
those familiar images so long regarded as mere entertainment.
The Latin origin for the word
classic referred to ancient art
forms appealing to the Roman
elite, and eventually the term was
applied to all art designated as
relating to the superior class of
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any society. Through the auspices
of its educational and cultural institutions, our society throughout
its history has fostered this definition and has indoctrinated Americans to believe that the objects of
art, even when their subject matter concerns the everyday lives of
ordinary individuals, are always
to be separate from the workaday
existence of the average citizen.
Often, art has been promoted devoutly as an alternative to the
worldly experiences of the working class.
This has been especially true in
the tumult of the twentieth century, the age of modern art, a
period in which creativity has become a religion and the creations
of
the
imagination
have
supplanted God in the minds of
many prominent practitioners as
well as in the hearts of a multitude of their followers. As Wallace Stevens once stated: "If one
no longer believes in God (as
truth), it is not possible merely to
disbelieve; it becomes necessary
to believe in something else. Logically, I ought to believe in essential imagination, but that has its
difficulties. It is easier to believe
in a thing created by imagination."
Thus today symphony orchestras and opera companies perform in cathedral-like edifices.
Performances of the great plays
and ballets are relegated to suitably reverent locations a considerable distance from the vast majority of Americans: these presentations are consigned to our largest
metropolises, the capitols of culture to which many seeking intellectual and artistic enrichment
make regular pilgrimages. In
large part, these activities are
priced beyond the means of the
masses, especially for most of
those who inhabit these cities;
consequently, these solemn rituals
of art maintain what might be

seen as merely a mythological
presence for a plurality of the
populace.
Paintings
and
sculptures are bought for millions
of dollars and sold for millions
more, permanent property of the
wealthy elite; and although many
of these works may be viewed at
times in the museums of our
urban centers, they are enshrined
like holy relics.
In contrast, film and television
have cut across all strata of class
to become integral components in
contemporary society. Although
television's most significant and
most persuasive contributions
have been its live special reports
of breaking news, its extensive
documentation of our society's
past four decades, and its coverage of major sporting events, regular programming also has affected the attitudes and opinions
of the American people. Whether
we use television to teach our
children with Sesame Street or to
educate ourselves with A Walk
through

the

Twentieth

Century,

whether we are moved by a poignant episode of Masterpiece
Theatre or are affected by a
touching scene in St. Elsewhere,
whether
we
are
compelled
through the biting comedy of All
in the Family to challenge our nation's sadly enduring acceptance
of racism or asked through the
bittersweet humor of M*A*S*H
to question the ancient and overtly glorious descriptions of war,
the pictures presented daily on
our television sets have indelibly
marked our minds and forever
influenced all of our lives.
Likewise, the images of film
have become fixed in the collective memory of our society. The
imposing figure of Charles Foster
Kane has shaped Americans'
opinions of the excesses and eccentncmes of the wealthy as
much as any authentic biography.
For most Americans, the horrors
The Cresset

and the hardships of the Civil
War have become more real
through the eyes of Scarlett
O'Hara and Rhett Butler than
from the pages of any academic's
historical text. Our understanding of romance, our respect for
personal sacrifice, and our empathy for victims of circumstances
beyond their control have been
enhanced by two former lovers,
Rick and lisa, caught in a North
African city occupied by the
Nazis during World War II. For
many, Rocky Balboa's pursuit of
the heavyweight championship
has personified the underdog's
battle against all odds, just as
Terry Malloy, a slow-witted exfighter working as a longshoreman, has helped formulate a definition of courage. George Bailey
annually has offered all Americans an affirmation of the preciousness of life, and when a
young man with the plain name
of Smith (bearing a striking resemblance to Bailey) repeatedly
has travelled to Washington, he
has carried with him the hopes
and values of all watching.
One can go on and on with a
seemingly unending list of characters and images from simple or
sophisticated movies-some admittedly better than others, but
all of which have moved and inspired their audiences throughout this first century of film. Unlike the icons of other arts which
we venerate as sacred and distant
(almost otherworldly), the individuals who populate the scenes
of our most popular and most influential films very nearly have
become
close
acquaintances,
many with friendly faces to which
we turn again and again, especially since the advent of the videocassette recorder, for comfirmation, comfort, and counsel.
Given this sense of familiarity,
it may be difficult for many
Americans to see their favorite
December, 1988

film and television personalities
as museum pieces, perfect objects
of art preserved in air-tight enclosures for posterity. Additionally, since these characters have
provided much of our lively entertainment throughout the years,
it could seem criminal to condemn them to the cultural
taxidermy associated with most
museums. After all, these are the
figures who have supplied us
with enjoyment, the subjects who
have distracted us from the mundane travails of everyday living.
A process of elevating those
who brought to life these characters from the simple status of
performers or filmmakers to formally acknowledged artists, to
permanent residents of a dignified cultural institution, to artifacts of an age would be difficult for many Americans to accept. By requesting that Americans regard the media of the
moving image with such respect,

it may appear as if the court jester suddenly were being presented to the people of the palace
for coronation or, in the eyes of
some, for public execution.
Still, the elevation of the media
of the moving image and its artists through the establishment of
this museum is a welcome, and
somewhat overdue, development.
Although only one hundred years
have passed since the first technical breakthrough allowed it to be
possible for even the primitive
viewing of motion pictures by the
American public, film and television have built a rich tradition
full of works which have served
as witness to times of turmoil in
the twentieth century. Through
their images, the two media already have exerted enough political impact and social influence to
substantially give shape to the
American society soon to step
tentatively toward the twenty-first
century.
Cl

Der alte Hermann
In the evening lugs
old Hermann a load of
opinions beneath his belt,
ballooning and perma-pressed,
from diner to newsstand and back,
self-appointed town crier
and local connoisseur,
savoring with fleshy
German lips Torte and Tee,
and savoring
die sehr schonen Frauleins
with skin as wholesome
as the finest cheese.

David Morgan
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Review Essay

Writing Oneself
Jill Baumgaertner

Scandal
By Shusaku Endo. Translated by
Van C. Gessel. New York: Dodd,
Mead. 261 pp. $18.95.
Scandal, the latest novel by
Shusaku Endo, the Japanese
Christian, is about duplicity and
contradiction, about sin and evil,
about old age and death, but it is
also about redemption, light, and
the Resurrection. It is, in short,
about the contradiction that is at
the heart of human experience.
Shusaku Endo is Japan's leading novelist and has won a
number of prestigious awards for
h is novels and short stories, the
best known of which are Silence,
Wonderful Fool, and Stained Glass
Elegies. It is a curious phenomenon that Endo's work, most of
which develops explicitly Christian themes, is so popular in a nation in which Christianity has
never flourished in spite of many
centuries of concerted missionary
efforts. Scandal has particular interest in this regard because it is

J ill Baumgaertner is Poetry Editor
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about an esteemed Japanese
Christian novelist who is at work
on a novel ca lled Scandal: An Old
Man's Prayer, blurring the distinctions between autobiography and
fiction, allowing the reader to
look into this book as if it were a
mirror held up in front of
another mirror, reflecting itself
hundreds of times.
To further complicate the picture, the novelist, Suguro Sensei,
discovers that he has a double, a
doppelganger, who frequents the
red-light district and is attracted
to a group of sadomasochists.
This double is a sinister, degenerate fraud who seems determined
to undermine Suguro's reputation, attempting to reveal the
novelist as an opportunist, and a
hypocrite and liar about his faith.
Suguro sets out to find this double and along the way d iscovers
that a young reporter is on his
trail, too, and ready to advance
his own journalistic career by uncovering the scandal of an ostensibly pious man with a sordid secret.
Suguro's dilemma is complex.
He is known as a Christian
novelist, but he did not really
mean to proselytize in his work.
He meant only to write stories,
but in the process he could not
help revealing what he was.
When a young man approaches
him after an autograph session
and tells Suguro that his writing
has actually converted him to
Christianity, Suguro can only feel
embarrassed and hypocritical because "he had not written a single
story with the intent of instructing others. He had not become a
novelist with a goal of promulgating Christianity." He does not
want his readers to overestimate
him . Instead, he insists in a television interview, "I'm not a theologian . . . . I've just stumbled toward that idea [about sin] while
writing my stories."

Suguro meets a women who on
the one hand lives a saintly life,
volunteering in a children's hospital to care for the sick and
dying, and yet, she confesses to
Suguro, she experiences much
pleasure in remembering a violent act her husband committed
during the war. I n a letter, she
writes, "You might want to ask,
which of these two is the real
Mariko? All I can say is that both
of them are me. You might ask,
don't the contradictions between
the two cause you any torment?
Yes, sometimes when I think
about those contradictions, I horrify myself. I am repelled by myself. But there are also times
when I am not, and there is nothing I can do about it."

This novel is about
authorial intent,
Christian aesthetics,
and the contradictory
beings we all are.
Suguro had previously written
about the ambiguity of human action, but his emphasis had been
significantly different. He had
contended that each sin contained within it the human
hunger for rebirth. He had
never, however, really confronted
evil. Now he finds himself looking evil straight in the face-and
the face is his own, or rather that
of his double, hanging in a portrait gallery. Are the actions of
that doppelganger completely
separate from his own, he begins
to wonder.
This novel is about authorial
intent, Christian aesthetics, and
the contradictory beings we all
are. Suguro discovers that he is
filled with antithetical traits. He is
meek and arrogant, bullish and
victimized, wise and foolish, sinThe Cresset
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ful and redeemed. He is no
more, no less, than any of us. He
has seen the Vision , he has been
in the stable on Christmas morning where, as W. H . Auden says,
"everything became a 'You' and
nothing was an 'it"'-and even
after experiencing the Incarnation he has "failed to entertain it
as more than an agreeable possibility." Living in limbo between
Christmas and Easter, he sees the
possibility for redemption, but
has not yet experienced a true resurrection-nor will he, really,
until death, his final healing.

Living between Christmas
and Easter, he sees the
possibility for
redemption, but he has
not yet experi enced a
true resurrection-nor
will he until death.
In

Dostoevsky's The Brothers
Karamazov, Dmitri agonizes over
his contradictory nature. "Yes ,
man is broad, too broad, indeed.
I'd have him narrower," he cries.
"Let me be accursed. Let me be
vile and base, only let me kiss the
hem of the veil in which my God
is shrouded. Though I may be
following the devil, I am Thy
son, 0 Lord, and I love Thee,
and I feel the joy without which
the world cannot stand."
It is this sort of contradiction
that Endo examines in Scandal.
All fiction writers, of course, rely
on contradictions, for the storymaking faculty is one of ordering
the chaos, of using contradiction
and conflict to make sense of the
contradictions and conflicts of
our everyday lives, but the Christian writer adds yet another dimension to the dilemma. How
can God take murder and violent
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death and make it redemptive?
How can the cross, an instrument
of torture, be also the sign of salvation ? How can the last be first?
How can death become birth?
How can our end be our beginning?
"Oh, to vex me," John Donne
says, "contraryes meet in one . I
durst not view heaven yesterday;
and today in prayers and flattering speeches I court God . Tomorrow I quake with true feare
of his rod." We are, according to
Donne and Dostoevsky and Endo,
connected to heaven, while we
are simultaneously stuck in this
often muddy earth. Our two natures are yoked violently together. And it is often not a satisfactory fusion.
The ambiguities and uncertainties are intriguing, making Endo's
story oddly believable. The only
problem with the book is the uneven writing, which may be the
fault of the translator. I suspect,
however, that the problem is
Endo's himself. Reading this
book, one has the sense that the
idea came before the charactersthat even though Endo chose
someone like himself as his persona, he didn't feel compelled to
spend too much time developing
this other "double" as a separate,
believable
entity.
But
even
though
the
characters
are
strangely flat, the story works because the questions it presents are
central to human life.
So what is the answer for Suguro? It is provided partially in a
startling encounter in a hotel
room, but it is also left partially
unresolved. Shusaku Endo, m
fact, has no complete answers .
Near the end of the book, Suguro is asked some pointed questions by Mariko:
"This Jesus you believe in .. . I
wonder if he was murdered because he was too innocent, too
pure."

"What are yo u driving at?"
"As Jesus , bathed in blood, carried his cross to the execution
ground, the crowds reviled hi m
and threw stones at him . Don't you
think they did that because of the
pleasure it gave them, the pleasure
I'm always trying to describe to
you? A naive, pure human being is
suffering right before their eyes.
Can't we assume that it was the
pleasure of heaping further indignities on such a person that consumed the mobs that day? J esus
was too blameless, too unblemished
. . . so much so that we wanted to
destroy him. . . . That feel ing is
shared by all of us . I t in habits the
depths of ou r hearts. But no one
wants to stare it in the face . That's
how you've fe lt for many years,
Sensei. Even in your novels ... in
reality all you've written about are
men who have betrayed J esus but
then weep tears of regret after the
cock crows three times. You've always avoided writing about the
mob, intoxicated with pleasure as
they hurled stones at him ."
"There are things a novelist can't
bring himself to write about."
"That's a neat evasion."

Even though the
characters are strangely
flat, the novel works
because its questions are
central to human life.
This novel asks the questions
that need to be articulated . T he
answers, however, are not so easy
because they lie in the realm of
dream and mystery, of doppelgangers, demons, and the Resu rrection. At the end of Scandel the
threatening p hone calls continue,
even though the reporter has
been paid off. Or do they continue because the repor ter has
been paid off? T he im plication is,
finall y, that Sugu ro cannot tell
the tru th because no one would
ever believe it. In fact, the "truth"
is itself suspect. Is that a neat evasion, or is that just the way it is?

••
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The Annual Battles
Of Christmas
Dot Nuechterlein
Oh, dear, it is December. That
means we are just around the
corner from The Annual Battles
of Christmas. Obviously I inherited an incredible amount of fortitude from some stalwart ancestor, because when it comes to The
A B of C, I stand totally alone.
The first A is the less serious of
the Bs, but it leaves me drained
and dragging. My family shows no
mercy, each year pointing accusing fingers in my direction and
claiming I simply ruin their enjoyment of the Holy Holiday.
It has to do with timing, and traditions, and stuff like that. As you
may have heard me say before, I
was brought up to believe that
Christmas is a season unto itself,
preceded by Advent and followed
by Epiphany, and I tried to raise
my children in these same beliefs.
Alas. They are creatures of the
general culture, which holds that
Christmas begins the day after
Thanksgiving and ends Dec. 25 at
midnight.
It wasn't easy to shush them up
even as babes, but it has grown
worse with each succeeding year.
I have stuck to my guns, refusing
to buy a tree until the last weekend
before the great Eve and Day. But
oh, how I have suffered for it.
"It's not fair ," one would complain every Dec. 1st (meaning in
translation BAD MOTHER), "everyone else has a tree but us."
"Yeah," would chime in another,
you
don't
care"
(BAD
MOTHER); "we might as well not
bother to put one up at all. "
"Yeah ," would echo the third,
"there won't be anything good left
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by the time we get one anyway"
(BAD MOTHER).
As they reached the age of
reason I would try a reasonable
argument; the Christmas season, I
would say, is not meant for University faculty persons-we are
grading papers and exams right
up till the last minute (like this
year's deadline is Dec. 22).
That point would boomerang,
however, reminding them of the
impoverishment of growing up in
a
two-career
family
(BAD
MOTHER) where the only Christmas cookies you-know-who ever
baked came on New Year's or
later or never, and where the relevant parent couldn't be trusted
to volunteer for school parties,
etc. That the annual greetingcard-cum-letter to relatives and
friends normally comes out in
January didn't interest themwhich is just as well, as no self-respecting person calling herself
Mom would ever allow such a
tragedy.
Himself took little part in this
Battle, agreeing with the kinder
that things were usually in a sorry
state tree-wise by Advent IV, but
unwilling to make too big a fuss
for fear he might be maneuvered
into attending to matters solo.
However, he has always egregiously forsaken his vows to love,
honor, and come to some sort of
intelligent compromise with wifey
when the second A B of C turns
up, as it does each and every year
without fail. I'm sorry to seem defensive, but you simply cannot
fathom how hopeless and helpless
the squabble has become. I refer
to the question of "Real vs. Fake."
They are all against me, every
blessed one of them. I keep explaining over and over how plastic
and artificial fake trees seem, but
the cleverness of that argument
makes not the tiniest dint in their
acceptance of this horror of modernity. It's a matter of taste. I like

the look and smell and feel of
God's trees; besides, can you
imagine Martin Luther starting
this business using any substance
with "poly" in its name? Now, really. True, Fake are quick and
easy (although hazardous-my
brother-in-law once broke his arm
trying to get one together)-and
true, Fake will not leave little reminders behind which show up
months later-Fake does not
shed.
But Fake is not R eal, which in
my book is what counts. So I've
held out. And you should know
that the only reason I manage to
win this Battle, every year, is because all of them want lights on
the tree, but not one has any tendency whatsoever to provide the
labor needed to make it happen.
That is strictly Mom's Job. So
okay, says I, then argue and complain all you want, but Mom will
only do it on Real.
So into the house comes whatever bedraggled leftover we can
find and onto it go the lights and
all the ornaments we possess and
sometimes but not always we
throw on some tinsel, and then we
turn out all the other lights and sit
there looking at it and making
cracks about how deformed it is
(as it always is) and reminiscing
about past Christmases, and we
listen to Dad's same old collection
of Christmas records and the A B
of C are, for the moment, forgotten , and everyone seems contented.
But woe-there's a cloud on the
horizon: next Christmas I'll be living in New York City, where, I'm
been told, one cannot even contemplate Real for less than many
bucks. They say smugly they will
"civilize" me yet! But I will find a
way. I WILL-if nothing more
than by adopting a baby Norfolk
pine. I mean, after all , some
things are just sacred.
Merry Christmas.
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The Cresset

